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Seeing the Forest for the Treaties - Evolving Debates on CDM Forest and Forestry 
Project Activities 10 Years After the Kyoto Protocol 
 
Rômulo Silveira da Rocha Sampaio1
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 The direct and formal relationship between unsustainable forestry practices and 
global climate change goes back at least to the late 1970’s. Since the Declaration of the 
World Climate Conference in 1979, the international community acknowledged that 
deforestation, and changes of land use, such as agriculture and pastoral practices, were 
contributing to the increased amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.2 In 1989, the 
Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and Climatic Change recognized a 
growing international preoccupation with the alteration of the composition of the Earth’s 
atmosphere due to anthropogenic activities; stressed out the importance of sustainable 
forestry, reforestation, afforestation and conservation activities; and called for a world net 
forest growth of 12 million hectares per year in the beginning of the 21st Century.3 Shortly 
after IPCC’s First Assessment report, the Second World Climate Conference, held in 
Geneva from 29 October to 7 November 1990, called upon the international community to 
take measures to increase “sinks” of greenhouse gases.4
 This was the scenario on forest and forestry leading to the 1992 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the formal and fundamental pillar 
to the current climate change legal regime. Among general norms and principles, the 
Convention called upon developed countries, based on the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility, to adopt binding commitments envisioning greenhouse gases 
emissions reductions and limitations. In mitigating the adverse impacts of emissions 
limitations and reductions commitments, the Convention allowed the Parties to implement 
policies and measures domestically, and/or jointly. 
 This present study focuses on the evolving debates on forest and forestry activities 
implemented jointly, more specifically those under the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), 15 years after the UNFCCC, and 10 years after the Kyoto Protocol. Launched by 
COP-1 through the so-called Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) Pilot Phase, it was the 
Kyoto Protocol that effectively created the flexibility mechanisms that would allow for 
joint implementation of policies and measures under the climate change regime. Articles 6 
and 12 respectively envisioned the joint implementation (JI) (between developed countries 
and economies in transition), and the clean development mechanism (CDM) (between 
developed and developing countries). The overall objective of this paper is to identify the 
current political, policy, legal, and technical challenges inherent to CDM project-based 
forest and forestry activities, provide with an assessment of likely trends for upcoming 
commitment periods and, finally, propose viable solutions to overcome future obstacles 
currently preventing further developments in this area of the CDM. 
                                                 
2 Declaration of the World Climate, Feb. 12- Feb. 23, 1979, 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0003/000376/037648eb.pdf (“[W]e can say with some confidence that the 
burning of fossil fuels, deforestation, and changes of land use have increased the amount of carbon dioxide in 
the atmosphere by about 15 per cent during the last century and it is at present increasing by about 0.4 per 
cent per year.”). 
3 The Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change, Nov. 7, 1989, Selected 
International Legal Materials on Global Warming and Climate Change, 5 AM. U.J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 513, 
592-601 (1990) [hereinafter Noordwijk Declaration]. 
4 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Homepage, 
http://unfccc.int/resource/ccsites/senegal/fact/fs221.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2007) [hereinafter UNFCCC 
Homepage]. 
 4
 For that, this paper is divided into four different sections as follow: the first one is 
designed to demonstrate how forest and sustainable forestry practices were introduced into 
the climate change legal regime, the science supporting such inclusion, and the different 
definitions, legal status and possible approaches to deal with the issue envisioned by the 
UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and Decisions of the Conference of the Parties / Meeting of the 
Parties. The second session is built toward formulating a legal and institutional framework 
specific to the CDM forest and forestry project-based within the complex and 
comprehensive climate change regime. The third part of the paper identifies the current 
obstacles, challenges and impacts to forestry project-activities under the CDM. Lastly, 
session four raises possible solutions to overcome those obstacles and challenges for 
upcoming commitment periods.  
  
2. The Introduction of Forest and Forestry Activities Into the Climate Change 
Legal Regime  
 
 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
constituting the formal and fundamental multilateral international agreement of the climate 
change legal regime, was adopted in New York on May 9th, 1992, and fully launched 
during the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)5 
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.6 In its Preamble, the Convention expressly recognized the role 
and importance of terrestrial ecosystems of “sinks” and “reservoirs” of greenhouse gases in 
mitigating global warming.7  
 According to the UNFCCC Handbook, “[a] sink is a process, activity or mechanism 
that removes GHG from the atmosphere; a reservoir is part of the climate system that 
enables a GHG to be stored.”.8 The characterization of forests and forestry activities as 
types of “sinks” and “reservoirs”9 of carbon dioxide (CO2) was established by scientific 
studies, inspiring the climate change legal regime.10 Legally, despite some general 
reference to promoting enhancement of forests, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases 
(e.g. articles 4.1(d) and 2(a) of the Convention), the term “forestry” appears once in the 
                                                 
5 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Jun. 3 – Jun. 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 819 
[hereinafter UNCED]. See generally VED P. NANDA & GEORGE PRING, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY & FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 79 (Transnational Publishers 2003) (emphasizing that with the 1972 UN 
Conference on the Human Environment and Development (UNCED), the UNCED is a milestone in 
international environmental lawmaking).  
6 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC, Handbook, at 19 (2006), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/handbook.pdf (last visited Jul. 23, 2007) [hereinafter UNFCCC 
Handbook] (a very useful reference material published by the UNFCCC Secretariat “designed to provide an 
easy route to understanding the climate change negotiations under the Convention.”). 
7 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May  9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (entered into force 
Mar. 21, 1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC] (“Aware of the role and importance in terrestrial and marine 
ecosystems of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases,”).  
8 UNFCCC Handbook, supra note 6, at 24. 
9 UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 4.1(d) (other examples of “sinks” and “reservoirs” of greenhouse gases are 
biomass, oceans and other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems).  
10 See generally SEBASTIAN OBERTHÜR & HERMANN E. OTT, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE  POLICY  
FOR THE 21ST  CENTURY 9 (Springer 1999) (describing the scientific knowledge on forests and forestry 
activities behind the climate change legal regime).  
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Convention,11 but without a legal definition being provided.12
 
a. The Science Linking Forest and Forestry Activities to the Climate 
Change Legal Regime: “Sinks”, “Reservoirs”, and “Sources” of CO2. 
 
 Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the dominant and most important greenhouse gas13 among 
the five others listed by the climate change legal regime.14 Carbon dioxide is also the 
parameter for measuring other greenhouse gases emissions.15 In this context, forests play a 
role by directly absorbing and storing CO2, but also, indirectly, by offsetting other 
greenhouse gases emissions.16  
 Growing forests and plants, through photosynthesis, have enormous capacities of 
carbon sequestration. Long established old-growth and mature forests can store significant 
amounts of carbon for long periods of time.17 Nonetheless, when disturbed, forests no 
longer play a mitigation role in global warming. Rather, they become part of the problem, a 
considerable source of carbon dioxide (CO2).18 Whenever the capacity of the ecosystem to 
                                                 
11 UNFCC, supra note 7, art. 4.1(c). 
12 Cf. Imke Sagemuller, Forest Sinks Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
and The Kyoto Protocol: Opportunity or Risk for Biodiversity, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 189, 201 (2003) (“As 
a framework convention, the UNFCCC includes only few broad references to the removal of GHGs by 
sinks.”). 
13 See S. Brown, M. Burnham, M. Delaney, M. Powell, R. Vaca and A. Moreno, Issues and Challenges for 
Forest-Based Carbon-Offset Projects: A Case Study of the Noel Kempff Climate Action Project in Bolivia, 5 
MITIGATION ADAPTATION  STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE  99, 99 (2000) (stating that carbon dioxide is the 
most important greenhouse gas in the atmosphere).  
14 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Annex A, Dec. 10, 1997, 
37 I.L.M. 32 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (other five listed gases are: methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)).  
15 Id. arts. 5.3, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 32. See DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 599 (Found. Press 2d ed. 2002) (1998). (“Not all greenhouse 
gases are created equal; different gases have different “global warming potentials” (GWPs). The technical 
definition of global warming potentials is the cumulative radiative forcing between the present and some 
chosen time horizon caused by a unit mass of gas emitted now, expressed relative to that for some reference 
gas, typically CO2. Thus, for example, the global warming potential of methane is 56 times that of CO2 or, 
put another way, Methane is 56 times more potent in causing global warming than is CO2 in a century. The 
global warming potential for nitrous oxide is 280 and the global warming potential is in the thousands for 
many of the HFCs, PFCs and SF6. Thus emitting one ton of these compounds into the atmosphere has 
dramatically higher impacts than emitting one ton of CO2 or even methane.”).  
16 Pedro Moura Costa & Charlie Wilson, An Equivalence Factor Between C02 Avoided Emissions and 
Sequestration – Description and Applications in Forestry, 5 MITIGATION ADAPTATION  STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL 
CHANGE  51, 51 (2000).  
17 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], IPCC Special Report Land Use, Land-Use Change, 
and Forestry, at 2, Summary for Pocilymakers (2000), http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/srlulucf-e.pdf [hereinafter 
IPCC Special Report LULUCF] (“Newly planted or regenerating forests, in the absence of major 
disturbances, will continue to uptake carbon for 20 to 50 years or more after establishment depending on 
species and site conditions, though quantitative projections beyond a few decades are uncertain.”). But see 
Hawk Jia, Old-growth forests ‘are key carbon sinks’ (Dec. 1, 2006), 
http://www.wbcsd.org/puglins/DocSearch/details.asp?type=DocDet&ObjectId=MjE5NzU (last visited Feb. 6, 
2007) (contending that a recent study conducted in a 400-year-old forest in southern China is being capable of 
soaking up carbon significantly faster than expected).  
18 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO], Climate Change and the Forest Sector: 
Possible National and Subnational Legislation, at 2 (2004), available at 
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uptake carbon is limited, or the rates of photosynthesis can no longer accompany the 
increasing rates of carbon concentrations in the atmosphere, or due to anthropogenic or 
natural ecosystem degradation, forests act as sources of CO2.19 As defined by the 
UNFCCC, article 1.9, a ‘“source” means any process or activity which releases a 
greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas into the atmosphere.”20. 
 Reflecting this common scientific understanding, article 4.1(d) of the Convention 
reinstated the role of forest conservation practices and called upon all parties, while 
respecting the principle of common but differentiated responsibility,21 to promote and 
cooperate in the enhancement of sinks and reservoirs.22   
   
b. Forest’s and Forestry Activities’ Definitions and Legal Status in the 
Climate Change Legal Regime 
 
 The definitions and legal status of forest and forestry that legally supported project 
activities under the climate change regime experienced two distinct phases: the first one, 
based on the generic concepts of “sink”, “reservoir” and “source” provided by the mother 
Convention up to the Kyoto Protocol; and a second one, with more precise and specific 
notions provided by the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent Conference of the Parties (COPs) 
and Meeting of the Parties (MOPs).23  
 
i. Definitions and Legal Status in the UNFCCC and Up to the 
Kyoto Protocol 
 
 The UNFCCC presents broad definitions of “sink”, “reservoir”, and “source” 24 to 
                                                                                                                                                    
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/y5647e/y5647e00.pdf. [hereinafter FAO Climate Change and the Forest 
Sector] (“In nature, GHGs are constantly entering and leaving the atmosphere. The oceans exchange CO2 and 
other GHGs with the atmosphere and hold CO2 dissolved or precipitated out in sediments. Actively growing 
trees and other plants capture CO2 from the atmosphere, combined with water through photosynthesis and 
create sugar and more stable carbohydrates. They may store a significant part of the carbon absorbed for 
appreciable lengths of time, from years to millennia. Carbohydrates become the building blocks and energy 
supply for most of life on Earth. Eventually, when plants and animals die, CO2 returns to the atmosphere. 
When wood products and other organic materials burn or decompose, they also release CO2.”).    
19 IPCC Special Report LULUCF, supra note 17, at 4. 
20 UNFCCC art. 1.9 supra note 7. 
21 See generally PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 285 (Cambridge Univ. Press 
2d ed. 2003) (1995) (discussing in deeper details the principle of common but differentiated responsibility). 
22 UNFCCC art. 4.1(d), supra note 7 (“All parties taking into account their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, 
shall: Promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as 
appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including 
biomass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems;”). 
23 See generally IPCC Special Report LULUCF, supra note 17, at Preface (stressing the importance of setting 
clear definitions for forests and forestry activities, the later encompassing afforestation, reforestation, and 
deforestation, and that “the challenge is to derive a set of definitions that are simple and consistent with the 
aims of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.”). 
24 UNFCCC, supra note 7, arts. 1.8, 1.7 and 1.9. (“‘Sink’ means any process, activity or mechanism which 
removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of greenhouse gas from the atmosphere.”; ‘reservoir’ 
means a component or components of the climate system where a greenhouse gas or a precursor of 
greenhouse gas is stored.”; ‘source’ means any process or activity which releases a greenhouse gas, an aerosol 
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which the concept of forest and forestry are subsumed and, therefore, supported project 
activities during the so-called Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) Pilot Phase.25 The 
primary concern during the negotiations at the three Conferences of the Parties (COP-1, 
COP-2 and COP-3, respectively 1995, 1996, and 1997) following the UNFCCC was to 
define quantified emissions reductions and limitations for developed countries.26 Issues 
relating to project-based forest and forestry activities were primarily a cost-effective27 way 
to make emissions reductions and limitations commitments feasible in the short term and, 
consequently, an important negotiation tool for the imposition of cap commitments upon 
developed countries.28  
 Only during the fourth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-4) (almost 
seven years after the UNFCCC) that a more specific legal regime for land use, land-use 
change and forestry started to emerge, one that would eventually encompass project-based 
forest and forestry activities.29
 Legally, though, at least until the Kyoto Protocol, the formal connection between 
forest and forestry with sink and reservoir was made by article 4.1(d) of the Convention. 
This provision called all Parties to promote actions to enhance sinks and reservoirs of 
greenhouse gases, including forests. 
 In this sense, from such ample definitions, on one hand, the legal status of forest and 
forestry is inferred: “sink” and “reservoir”. On the other hand, because forests can also emit 
CO2 when disturbed, according to the Convention, they could also be deemed as “sources” 
of greenhouse gases.30
                                                                                                                                                    
or a precursor of a greenhouse gas into the atmosphere.”).  
25 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on 
its First Session, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 5/CP.1, Activities 
implemented jointly under the pilot phase, Berlin, Mar. 28 – Apr. 7, 1995, 19 FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (June 
6, 1995) [hereinafter Decision 5/CP.1] (“1(b) Decides: That activities implemented jointly should be 
compatible with and supportive of national environment and development priorities and strategies, contribute 
to cost-effectiveness in achieving global benefits and could be conducted in a comprehensive manner 
covering all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases;”). 
26 See MICHAEL GRUBB, CHRISTIAAN VROLIJK & DUNCAN BRACK, THE EMERGION INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR 
CLIMATE CHANGE: STRUCTURES AND OPTIONS AFTER BERLIN 7 (The Royal Institute of International Affairs 1995) 
(assessing the outcome of the first Conference of the Parties, known as the Berlin Mandate, for whom “[t]he 
Mandate calls for a process to begin to strengthen commitments beyond 2000. This process should lead the 
industrialized world to ‘elaborate policies and measures’, and to ‘set quantified limitation and reduction 
objectives within specified time-frames, such as 2005, 2010 and 2020, for their anthropogenic emissions’. 
Negotiations are to be completed by early 1997 in order that the results can be adopted at ‘COP-3’(…). The 
expectation is that a protocol or other legal agreement will be negotiated at COP-3 defining emission 
constraints for Annex 1 Parties potentially up to the year 20202.”). 
27 See Joel N. Swisher, Joint Implementation Under the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change: 
Technical and Institutional Challenges, 2 MITIGATION ADAPTATION  STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 57, 60 
(1997) (emphasizing that “there are low-cost opportunities for carbon storage in the forestry sector”).  
28 See also id., supra note 27, at 58 (stressing that “expect Annex I countries to implement too large a share of 
the emission reductions could be physically or technically infeasible and would likely be inefficient”).  
29 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on 
its Fourth Session, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 9/CP.4, Land-use, 
land-use change and forestry, Buenos Aires, Nov. 2-14, 1998, 40 FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1 (January 25, 
1999) [hereinafter Decision 9/CP.4] (constituting the first specific decision on land use, land-use change and 
forestry).  
30 See Lavanya Rajamani, Re-Negotiating Kyoto: A Review of the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 201 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y  207 (2000) (“Forests can be 
 8
 In practical terms, this means that whenever the climate change legal regime refers 
to enhancement, promotion, and sustainable management of “sinks” and “reservoirs”, and 
calls for action to address anthropogenic emissions by “sources”, it is including and 
promoting actions on forests and forestry activities.31 The importance of this empirical 
analysis consists on the fact that the lack of more precise definitions and legal status for 
forest and forestry in this first period up until the Kyoto Protocol, led to no activity 
limitation whatsoever for those participating in the Activities Implemented Jointly Pilot 
Phase.32 For that reason, during the pilot phase, forest and forestry project activities 
included afforestation, reforestation, conservation practices and sustainable forest 
management.33
  
ii. Definitions and Legal Status in the Kyoto Protocol and 
Subsequent COPs/MOPs 
  
 After the Kyoto Protocol had expressly embraced forest and forestry practices, 
narrowing down the Convention’s broad definitions of sinks, reservoirs and sources of 
CO2,34 negotiators faced the need to create a specific legal regime to reconcile conflicting 
interests of those Parties supporting such activities with those opposing them.35 With the 
scientific support provided by the IPCC and FAO,36 added to the technical expertise of the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)37, negotiators began to 
shaping a more specific legal regime to address land use, land-use change and forestry.38  
                                                                                                                                                    
sources, sinks, or reservoirs of GHGs.”). 
31 See generally OBERTHÜR ET AL., supra note 10, at 131 (specifying the range of the term “sink”, and 
highlighting that “[i]n general, forests have the highest sink potential, depending, however, on age and 
condition of the forest.”).  
32 Decision 5/CP.1, supra note 25. 
33 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Review of the Implementation of the 
Convention and of Decisions of the First Session of the Conference of the Parties, Activities Implemented 
Jointly: Annual Review of Progress Under the Pilot Phase, Progress report on activities implemented jointly, 
Geneva, July 8 – 19, 1996, 5 FCCC/CP/1996/14 (June 4, 1995) [hereinafter 1996 AIJ Pilot Phase Report] 
(reporting the occurrence of five ongoing projects in forest preservation, restoration or reforestation and four 
in afforestation).  
34 Kyoto Protocol arts. 3.3 and 3.4, supra note 17. 
35 See FARHANA YAMIN & JOANNA DEPLEDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE REGIME A GUIDE TO RULES, 
INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 123 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004) (“The technical complexity, and high 
political stakes, of sinks issues contributed significantly to the breakdown of negotiations at The Hague at 
COP-6 part I.”). 
36 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on 
the First Part of its Sixth Session, Note by the President of the Conference of the Parties, The Hague, 
November 13-25, 2000, 12 FCCC/CP/2000/5/Add.2 (April 4, 2001) [hereinafter COP-6 Note by the 
President] (“Parties agree that for the implementation of Article 3.3, [of the Kyoto Protocol] “forest” is 
defined in accordance with the FAO definition. (…) Parties decide that for defining afforestation, 
reforestation and deforestation [forestry activities] the set of IPCC definitions shall be applied.”). 
37 See generally GRUBB ET AL., supra note 26, at 2 (explaining that the purpose of the SBSTA is to function as 
“the main interlocutor between the scientific world and the Convention process;” and stressing that the 
SBSTA is different from the IPCC). 
38 See OBERTHÜR ET AL., supra note 10, at 132 (“Although the issue of sinks always loomed in the background 
of the negotiations prior to Kyoto, serious negotiations on this only began at AGBM 8 in October 1997. At 
this meeting, many Parties realized that there was almost no factual basis on which to take a decision. The 
whole issue of LUCF (Land-use Change and Forestry), as it was finally referred to, was surrounded by 
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 The rationale behind a specific legal regime was to make the Convention’s ultimate 
objective feasible, by allowing developed countries to offset part of their quantified 
emissions reductions and limitations commitments through jointly project-based practices 
under flexibility mechanisms,39 (one approach) and through the promotion and 
enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases domestically (another 
approach).40
 Articles 3.3 and 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol set the stage for the beginning of a 
specific regulatory regime to deal with land-use change and forestry activities. The first 
decision carrying on the mandate established by the aforementioned provisions was 
decision 9/CP.4, taken pursuant COP-4 in Buenos Aires, 1999. From then on, this 
regulatory regime became known as “land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)”.41 
At a first stage, Parties opted for limiting LULUCF activities to afforestation, reforestation 
and deforestation practices,42 (the later meaning “avoided deforestation”43) while providing 
for enough flexibility to the inclusion of additional activities.44  
 Afforestation and reforestation are both defined as the human-induced conversion of 
non-forested areas into forested, but with a slightly difference: the prior presupposes that 
the converted land into forested area has not been forested for at least 50 years, while the 
later is the conversion of land that once was forested into forested area, but limited to those 
areas that did not have forest on December 31, 1989.45
 Under intense political debate over conflicting interests,46 the Parties agreed upon 
                                                                                                                                                    
uncertainties.”).  
39 Anita M. Halvorssen, The Kyoto Protocol and Developing Countries—The Clean Development Mechanism, 
16 COLO. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 353, 363 (2005) (“The Kyoto Protocol introduced three market-based, flexible 
mechanisms that enable Annex I Parties to meet part of their emission reduction commitments in a more cost 
effective manner. These mechanisms, also referred to as Kyoto Mechanisms, include emissions trading, joint 
implementation, and (…) clean development mechanism (CDM). The idea behind these mechanisms is that 
the cost of limiting emissions will differ from one region to another, yet the benefit for the atmosphere is the 
same, regardless of where the action is taken.”). 
40 See Mathew Vespa, Climate Change 2001: Kyoto At Bonn and Marrakech, 29 ECOLOGY L. Q. 395, 409 
(2002) (differentiating domestic application of land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) from 
LULUCF in the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol). 
41 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
Fourth Session, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 4/CP.9, Land-use, land-
use change, forestry, Buenos Aires, November 2 - 14, 1998, 40 FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1 (January 25, 1999) 
[hereinafter Decision 4/CP.9]. 
42 Kyoto Protocol art. 3.3, supra note 14 (“The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks resulting from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities, limited to 
afforestation, reforestation and deforestation….”).  
43 Pedro Moura-Costa, Forestry and the Climate Change Convention: 10 –years of Evolution, 7 available at 
http://www.gm-unccd.org/FIELD/Private/Eco/Eco3.pdf (last visited April 8, 2007).  
44 Kyoto Protocol art. 3.4, supra note 14 (“The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties 
to this Protocol shall, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, decide upon modalities, rules and 
guidelines as to how, and which, additional human-induced activities related to changes in greenhouse gas 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the agricultural soils and the land-use change and forestry 
categories shall be added to, or subtracted from, the assigned amounts for Parties included in Annex I….”).  
45 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
Seventh Session, Part Two: Action Taken, Decision 11/CP.7, Land-use, land-use change, forestry, Marrakech, 
Oct. 29 – Nov. 10, 2001, 58 FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (January 21, 2002) [hereinafter Decision 11/CP.7]. 
46 Rajamani, supra note 30, at 223 (“At COP-6, the Umbrella Group argued in favor of including additional 
activities in the first commitment period. However, the AOSIS and the EU opposed it.”).  
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additional activities during COP-7 in Marrakech47, adding revegetation, forest 
management, cropland management, and grazing land management to those activities 
conducted domestically, but excluding them from jointly implemented project-based 
activities.48  
 From the newly-established legal regime on LULUCF, definitions on activities, 
although broad in nature,49 were useful operational guidance on handling this one form of 
accountability under the UNFCCC. Thus, the Annex to decision 16/CMP.1 provided 
definitions to “forest”, “afforestation”, “reforestation”, “deforestation”, “revegetation”, 
“forest management”, “cropland management”, and “grazing land management”.50  
   
c. Two Different Approaches to Accounting for Forests and Forestry 
Activities 
   
 Because developed countries were concerned that reliance solely upon domestic 
measures to curb anthropogenic greenhouse gases emissions could impair their national 
economies by imposing a significant financial burden as a result of mandatory emissions 
reductions, the Kyoto Protocol envisioned accountability through market-based flexibility 
mechanisms: emissions trading, joint implementation, and clean development 
mechanism.51 For forest and forestry, this scenario opened two possible approaches: first, 
accounting domestically for LULUCF; and second, through project-based activities abroad 
limited to afforestation and reforestation practices.  
 
i. Accounting for Domestic Land Use, Land-Use Change, and 
Forestry Activities (LULUCF) 
   
 To some countries, accounting for LULUCF could offset up to 10% of their national 
gross emissions. For others, due to demographic and land-use patterns, sequestration 
potentials from enhancement of sinks are limited. As a consequence, accounting for 
LULUCF activities became a big part of the interests at stake during the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations, dividing the Parties considerably and impairing much of the progress on a 
common and satisfactory agreement.52  
 Through Decision 11/CP.7 the Parties addressed some of the previous concerns, 
while also requesting the SBSTA and the IPCC to develop and elaborate guidelines, 
                                                 
47 Decision 11/CP.7, supra note 45, at 54. 
48 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties serving 
as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session, Part Two: Action Taken, Decision 
16/CMP.1, Land-use, land-use change, forestry, Montreal, Nov. 28 – Dec. 10, 2005, 5 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (March 30, 2006) [hereinafter Decision 16/CMP.1]. 
49 See Sagemuller, supra note 12, at 203 (stressing the broadness of the definition of “deforestation” in the 
Marrakech Accords).  
50 Id., at 5. 
51 See generally Tim Jackson, Katherine Begg & Stuart Parkison, The Language of Flexibility: Operational 
forms of joint implementation, in FLEXIBILITY IN CLIMATE POLICY: MAKING THE KYOTO MECHANISMS WORK, 
22-26 (Tim Jackson, Katie Begg & Stuart Parkison eds., Earthscan 2001) (detailing the flexibility 
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol); 
52 MICHAEL GRUBB, CHRISTIAAN VROLIJK & DUNCAN BRACK, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL A GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT 79 
(The Royal Institute of International Affairs 1999). 
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monitoring and reporting methodologies.53 Following the Parties’ request, IPCC issued a 
report on good practice guidance for land use, land-use change and forestry,54 and another 
one on definitions and Methodological Options to Inventory Emissions from Direct Human 
Induced Degradation of Forests and Devegetation of Other Vegetation Types.55  The IPCC 
work and SBSTA advices were based on the general principles governing accountability for 
LULUCF activities undertaken domestically by Annex I countries.56  
 Under this framework regulatory regime governing LULUCF accountability, for the 
first commitment period57 a selected domestic forestry activity can add or subtract to an 
Annex I Party’s assigned amount, whether the practice constitute a sink or a source of 
carbon dioxide, respectively.58 Accountable forestry activities include afforestation, 
reforestation, deforestation, regevetation, forest, cropland and grazing land management.59  
 Any improvement made domestically using one or more of the abovementioned 
listed forestry activities will add to a Party’s assigned amount (“credits”) for the first 
commitment period, so long as a formal selection of any or all of them is made timely 
(identification in the Party’s annual report), demonstration that the chosen activities had 
occurred since 1990, and are human-induced.60 One the other hand, whenever verifiable 
human-induced changes in land use and forestry results in a net emission of greenhouse 
gas, a subtraction on an Annex I Party’s assigned amount shall take place.61  
 The estimates are based on annual national inventories and communications62 on 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks that Annex I Parties are 
required to submit.63 The information provided is used in the establishment of assigned 
amounts.64 A limitation in accounting, either positively (crediting) or negatively (debiting) 
for domestic LULUCF activities is imposed individually to each Annex I Party, and 
measured in metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent per year. Those quantified 
                                                 
53 Decision 11/CP.7, supra note 45, at 54. 
54 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], IPCC Report on Good Practice Guidance for Land 
Use, Land-use Change and Forestry, (2003), available at  http://www.ipcc-
nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gpglulucf/gpglulucf_files/Chp1/Chp1_Overview.pdf [hereinafter IPCC Report on 
Good Practice Guidance for LUCF].  
55 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], IPCC Report on Definitions and Methodological 
Options to Inventory Emissions from Direct Human Induced Degradation of Forests and Devegetation of 
Other Vegetation Types, (2003), available at http://www.ipcc-
nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gpglulucf/gpglulucf_files/Task2/Degradation.pdf [hereinafter IPCC Report on 
Definitions and Methodological Options to Inventory Emissions].  
56 See Decision 16/CMP.1 annex, supra note 48, at 3. 
57 Kyoto Protocol art. 3.7, supra note 14 (establishing the first commitment period from 2008-2012, within 
which Annex I Parties will have to meet their quantified limitation and reduction objectives set forth in Annex 
B to the Protocol).  
58 Decision 16/CMP.1 annex, supra note 48, at 8. 
59 Id., at 6. 
60 Id., at 6. 
61 Id., at 8. 
62 See generally Halvorssen, supra note 39, at 360 (“[T]he UNFCCC required all Parties to develop 
inventories of anthropogenic emissions and measures to mitigate climate change. Furthermore, the UNFCCC, 
called “national communications.” To fulfill their reporting obligations, Annex I Parties were given six 
months from the entry into force of the UNFCCC to submit their reports, while non-Annex I Parties 
(developing countries) were given three years and the least developed States were not given a deadline.”).  
63 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 5.  
64 Decision 16/CMP.1 annex, supra note 48, at 8. 
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limitations to be subtracted or added to a Party’s assigned amount are found in an Appendix 
to Decision 16/CMP.1.65
    
ii. Accounting for Forestry Activities under Project-Based 
Flexibility Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol 
 
 Annex I Parties can claim credits against their assigned amounts for forestry project 
activities implemented jointly with another Annex I Party (Joint Implementation) or with a 
non-Annex I Party (Clean Development Mechanism).66 The origin of joint projects goes 
back to the text of the Convention,67 more precisely article 4.2(a) that generically 
mentioned the possibility of Annex I parties to implement policies and measures jointly.68  
 On the road to Kyoto, and during the negotiations of the protocol at COP-3, 
flexibility was a highly contentious issue among Parties. One the one side, the 
JUSSCANNZ69 countries envisioned the opportunity to invest in projects abroad as a cheap 
way to mitigate their commitments, especially those related to forest and forestry project 
activities70, and the only feasible way to achieve them without hurting their economies. On 
the other side, the G-77 plus China71 and the European Union faced them as a loophole in 
the Protocol. The prior feared the so-called “carbon colonialism” or “eco-colonialism”,72 
the later concern was basically on ethical grounds.73 Opponents saw forest and forestry 
projects abroad as allowing Annex I countries to invest in developing countries without 
having to take any stronger domestic mitigation measures.74  
 The conflicts were partially resolved with the parties agreeing upon limiting forestry 
                                                 
65 Id., at 7. 
66 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, arts. 6 and 12. 
67 Mark C. Trexler & Laura H. Kosloff, The 1997 Kyoto Protocol: What Does It Mean For Project-Based 
Climate Change Mitigation?, 3 MITIGATION ADAPTATION  STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 1, 2 (1998). 
68 UNFCCC art. 4.2(a), supra note 7 (“These Parties [Annex I] may implement such policies and measures 
[referring to those limiting anthropogenic greenhouse gases emissions] jointly with other Parties and may 
assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the Convention and, in particular, 
that of this subparagraph;”).  
69 GRUBB ET AL., supra note 52, at xxxi (“Group of countries working together, tending to counter-balance the 
EU on the one hand and G77 on the other. The group consists of Japan, the United States, Switzerland, 
Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand, though Norway and in particular Switzerland frequently stood 
somewhat apart from JUSSCANNZ positions.”).  
70 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers to Climate Change 2001: 
Synthesis Report of the IPCC Third Assessment Report 15 (2001), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/SYR-
text.pdf [hereinafter IPCC Third Assessment Report] (“Costs estimates report reported to date for biological 
mitigation vary significantly from US$0.1 to about US$20 per t C in several tropical countries and from 
US$20 to US$100 per t C in non-tropical countries.”).  
71 Id., at 5 (“The Group of 77 (and China) is the main negotiating group of developing countries, representing 
over 120 Parties in many international negotiations. The group includes countries with very different 
objectives, including OPEC and AOSIS”).  
72 Costa, supra note 43, at 4.  
73 See generally, Raoul Weiler, The Kyoto Protocol And Its Socio-Ethical Aspects, in READING THE KYOTO 
PROTOCOL ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 53-54 (Etienne Vermeersch ed., 
2005) (“The emission trading transforms a common good –the atmosphere- into a commercial good. The 
trading process turns the principle of the ‘polluter pays’ into the opposite ‘the polluter buys his way out’. 
From the ethical point of view the Protocol does not provide the necessary warrantees for ethical practices.”).  
74 See GRUBB ET AL., supra note 52, at 87 (detailing the conflict of interests around the debate on flexible 
mechanisms).  
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activities to afforestation and reforestation projects, the exclusion of nuclear activities,75 
and the requirement that project-based activities shall be supplemental to domestic 
measures and policies.76 Subsequently, since the Marrakech Accords (COP-7) the debate 
around this controversy is void, due to the express embracement of forestry activities by 
decision 11/CP.7.77  
   
3. Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Forest and Forestry Project Activities: 
Legal and Institutional Framework 
 
 This section aims at building and examining the CDM forest and forestry project-
activities legal and institutional framework and how they were influenced by the conflicting 
interests surrounding them, the evolution of scientific and technological knowledge, and the 
practice provided during the AIJ pilot phase.  
 
a. The Evolution of the Legal Framework 
 
 A legal framework for forest and forest project-activities in the CDM is a sub-
product of a broader regulatory regime for joint implementation flexibility mechanisms. 
Articles 4.2(a), (b), (d), and 3.3 of the UNFCCC are the main pillars of the joint 
implementation regulatory regime.78 The first action in this regard was taken at COP-1, in 
Berlin, 1995, when the parties agreed upon an Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) Pilot 
Phase.79 Shortly after, the Kyoto Protocol not only embraced the concept of Joint 
Implementation among Annex I Parties, but also extended it to non-Annex I countries 
(Clean Development Mechanism).80  
 
i. Activities Implemented Jointly Pilot Phase 
 
 The AIJ pilot phase made operational the UNFCCC broad provisions authorizing 
joint implementation of policies and measures.81 Decision 5/CP.1 taken at COP-1, in 
Berlin, 1995, expressly recognized the mandate of Article 4.2(d) imposing upon the 
Conference of the Parties the duty to regulate joint implementation of policies and 
measures to curb anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. To reconcile and 
accommodate developing countries’ concerns, project-activities undertaken pursuant to the 
                                                 
75 See generally Jason Schwartz, “Whose Woods These Are I Think I Know”: How Kyoto May Change Who 
Controls Biodiversity, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 421, 457 (2006) (suggesting that the EU accepted the inclusion 
of forestry in the CDM as a tradeoff for the exclusion of nuclear power projects). 
76 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
Ninth Session, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 19/CP.9, Modalities and 
procedures for afforestation and reforestation project activities under the clean development mechanism in 
the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, Milan, December 1 - 12, 2003, 13 FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.2 
(March 30, 2004) [hereinafter Decision 19/CP.9]. 
77 Decision 11/CP.7, supra note 45, at 60 (“The eligibility of land use, land-use change and forestry project 
activities under Article 12 is limited to afforestation and reforestation.”).  
78 Naoki Matsuo, CDM in the Kyoto Negotiations: How CDM has Worked as a Bridge between Developed 
and Developing Worlds?, 8 MITIGATION ADAPTATION  STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 191, 192 (2003). 
79 Decision 5/CP.1, supra note 25, at 19. 
80 Kyoto Protocol arts. 6 & 12, supra note 14. 
81 UNFCCC arts. 4.2(a) (b) (d) & 3.3, supra note 7.  
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pilot phase did not provide credits against the, then, not yet agreed upon developed 
countries’ assigned amounts. The AIJ pilot phase was voluntarily in nature.  
 Moreover, the pilot phase embraced participation of non-Annex I countries hosting 
project-based activities undertaken thereof. This experimental period also covered 
generically “all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases;”, allowing for 
ample use of forest and forestry project activities. The fact is that, “[t]he importance of 
information, training, appropriate capacity and institutions for the development of CDM 
projects is underlined by experience from the pilot phase of Activities Implemented 
Jointly.”.82  
 The Parties’ experience during the pilot phase showed geographic trends and 
potential social and environmental benefits related to forest and forestry project activities, 
which provided substantial background on future negotiations. 83 All these elements were 
crucial during the discussions over flexibility mechanisms in Kyoto, during the COP-3, and 
beyond, when negotiators faced the dilemma, and conflicting pressures of whether to 
include or not forest and forestry activities in the CDM.84  
  
1. A Brief Assessment of the AIJ Pilot Phase Main Reports, 
and Positive Outcomes 
 
 Through the AIJ pilot phase reporting requirements, the SBSTA was able to 
produce annual synthesis reports, before recommending a comprehensive review of the 
pilot phase, which was completed and sent to the COP-5 in Bonn, 1999.85 Specifically with 
regard to forest and forestry project activities, those annual synthesis reports and the final 
review of the AIJ pilot phase provided useful data on important geographical trends, 
technical challenges (monitoring and reporting), social and environmental benefits and 
impacts, possible global benefits (in comparison with other types of project-activities), and 
implications on national economies (helping developing countries to achieve sustainable 
development, and developed countries in achieving their commitments under the climate 
change regime).86 The figures bellow, excerpted from the SBSTA synthesis reports on AIJ 
pilot phase, illustrate the aforementioned elements of the experiences gained during this 
experimental period:    
                                                 
82 Alex Michaelowa, CDM Host Country Institution Building, 8 MITIGATION ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 201, 202 (2003). 
83 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice & Subsidiary Body for Implementation on Activities Implemented Jointly 
Under the Pilot Phase, Issues to be addressed in the review of the pilot phase, Bonn, Oct. 25 – Nov. 5, 1999, 
5 FCCC/SB/1999/5 (September 15, 1999) [hereinafter SBSTA & SBI 1999 Report] (presenting data on 
geographical distribution of projects, environmental and socio-economic impacts). 
84 See id., at 5 (providing an “[a]ssessment of environmental benefits related to the mitigation of climate 
change that would not have occurred in the absence of AIJ, covering all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs 
of greenhouse gases and the methods used to measure, monitor and independently verify these emissions, 
including by type of project, and other environmental benefits.”). 
85 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
Fifth Session, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 13/CP.5, Activities 
implemented jointly under the pilot phase, Bonn, Oct. 25 – Nov. 5, 2000, 36 FCCC/CP/1999/6/Add.1 
(February 2, 2000) [hereinafter Decision 13/CP.5] (taking note of the comprehensive review of the AIJ pilot 
phase produced by the SBSTA and SBI).  




Source: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot 
Phase, Synthesis report on activities implemented jointly, Bonn, October 20 – 29, 1997, 2 





Source: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot 
Phase, Fourth synthesis report and draft revised uniform reporting format, Marrakesh, Oct. 29 




 Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are excerpted from the first and fifth synthesis report on the pilot 
phase of AIJ, respectively. With respect to the number of forest conservation and forestry 
activities and their share in the total reduction of carbon dioxide in 1997, Figure 3.1 shows 
that while only numbering 6 out of 39 projects (roughly 15 per cent of the total), they 
account for 57 per cent of the final mitigation impact. On the other hand, in 2001, Figure 
3.2 shows that while numbering 15 out of 139 projects (roughly 10 per cent of the total), 
forest conservation and forestry activities accounted for 35 per cent of the abatement 
impact. The data demonstrates that although representing a smaller portion of the total 
number of projects, sequestration potentials of forest and forestry activities are significantly 
higher in a comparison with other types of projects. In addition, the data collected from 
different years shows that the number of forest and forestry project activities decreased 
proportionately to the rising on scientific and technical knowledge and certainty on the 
complexities of processes related to these activities.87  
 In its first synthesis report, the SBSTA highlighted that “most data on the costs and 
the amount of GHG abated are only estimates and are, therefore, not a suitable basis for 
analysis;”.88 When the report was released, the Parties were in the final preparations for the 
Kyoto negotiations. The IPCC had not yet released its special report on LULUCF, which 
only happened in 2000.89 The first specific decision on forestry activities in the CDM was 
only agreed upon in 2003 at COP-9 (decision 19/CP.9),90 the same year in which the IPCC 
Report on Good Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry was 
released.91 This chronological scenario explains the proportionality between growing 
consensus on the challenges of forest and forestry project activities and the consequent 
decrease in their total share (both in quantity and in share of GHG abatement impact) in a 
comparison with other types of projects, deemed much simpler.   
 As to the geographical distribution of forest conservation and forestry projects, and 
their environmental and socio-economic impacts, the 1999 Subsidiary Bodies’ report on the 
issues to be addressed in the review of the pilot phase provided useful source of 
information for a more comprehensive assessment of the pilot phase. With regard to socio-
economic aspects of projects undertaken during the pilot phase, the Subsidiary Bodies 
verified an increase in capacity-building through enhancement of procedural and 
institutional experience, and the Parties reported “active involvement of local communities, 
increased public awareness, and the maintenance of natural heritage and historical site”.92  
 In this same path, the report highlighted that host Parties, most developing 
countries, were being able to attract financial resources and direct them towards national 
                                                 
87 Cf. Food and Agriculture Org. of the U.N. [FAO], Forestry Projects Under the CDM Procedures, 
Experiences and Lessons Learned, at 1, FAO Forests and Climate Change Working Paper 3 (2005), available 
at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/j7017e/j7017e00.pdf [hereinafter FAO Working Paper 3] (stating the 
challenges of afforestation and reforestation projects in the CDM years latter after the same types of projects 
undertaken in the AIJ pilot phase, when scientific and technical knowledge were not yet as consolidated).  
88 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific 
and Technological Advice & Subsidiary Body for Implementation on Activities Implemented Jointly Under the 
Pilot Phase, synthesis report on activities implemented jointly, Bonn, October 20 – 29, 1997, 4 
FCCC/SBSTA/1997/12 (October 7, 1997) [hereinafter SBSTA & SBI 1997 Report]. 
89 IPCC Special Report LULUCF, supra note 17, at 2. 
90 Decision 19/CP.9, supra note 76, at 13. 
91 IPCC Report on Good Practice Guidance for LUCF, supra note 54.  
92 SBSTA & SBI 1999 Report, supra note 83, at 20. 
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development goals. Despite the statement made by the Subsidiary Bodies that socio-
economic and environmental factors were not sufficiently addressed, specifically with 
respect to forest and forestry activities, the Parties reported environmental benefits on 
“fostering biodiversity, improving water and air quality and reducing erosion of 
hydrological resources”.93
 In the AIJ pilot phase review report, some Parties linked their development goals to 
forestry and land-use.94 Indeed, Figure 3.3 demonstrates that those Parties, despite not 
identified in the report, are most likely to be developing countries in the Latin American 
region. Figure 3.3 shows that most of forest preservation and reforestation projects, and 
roughly half of afforestation activities were taking place in Latin America and the 
Caribbean region. Not surprisingly, considering that a great percentage of the remaining 
tropical forests in the world are concentrated in Latin America.95  
 A better sense of the region’s potentials for these types of projects can be excerpted 
from the fact that the data presented does not list Brazil,96 by far the country with the 
greater portion of remaining tropical forests.97 In addition to the resources availability 
element, the costs of forest and forestry GHG abatement practices are considerably lower in 
developing countries, which contributed to Latin America’s share of the market in hosting 




Source: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the 
                                                 
93 SBSTA & SBI 1999 Report, supra note 83, at 19. 
94 Id., at 8. 
95 Food and Agriculture Org. of the U.N. [FAO], Global Forest Resource Assessment 2005, at 15, FAO 
Forestry Paper 147 (2005), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/A0400E/A0400E03.pdf [hereinafter 
FAO Global Forest Resource Assessment 2005].  
96 SBSTA & SBI 1999 Report, supra note 83, at 16 (“Belize, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama are hosting projects in Latin America.”).  
97 FAO Global Forest Resource Assessment 2005, supra note 95, at 15. 
98 See IPCC Third Assessment Report, supra note 70, at 15 (stating the abatement costs of forest and forestry 
activities projects).  
 18
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice & Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation on Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot Phase, part two: 
synthesis report on AIJ under the pilot phase, Bonn, Oct. 25 – Nov. 5, 1999, 5 
FCCC/SB/1999/5 (September 15, 1999) (AFR – Africa, ASP – Asia and Pacific Region, 
EIT – Economies in Transition, LAC – Latin America and Caribbean).  
 
2. The Main Challenges Encountered During the AIJ Pilot 
Phase 
 
 The major problems encountered by the Parties during the implementation of 
project activities were also summarized by the AIJ pilot phase reviewing report. 
Highlighting common constrains during the pilot phase was a useful tool for improvements 
in the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, particularly in the CDM that 
encompasses developing countries’ participation.99 Among general challenges and 
obstacles to all types of projects during the pilot phase, and specifically those related to 
forest and forestry were:  
 
(a) differences in the investment climate; (b) cultural differences; (c) insufficient 
infrastructure; (d) institutional capacity; (e) relative absence of investment 
companies; (f) lack of policy on AIJ and of a clear and transparent set of operational 
rules on the part of the host country; (g) lack of awareness in the private sector in 
host countries on opportunities represented by AIJ; (h) variations in the degree of 
knowledge and acceptance of AIJ by local stakeholders; (i) lack of capacity to 
produce comprehensive AIJ project proposals; (j) existing preferences, driven by 
established business partnerships, strategic considerations and political priorities for 
investors for particular areas; (k) differences in GHG reduction costs and in 
transaction costs due to, inter alia, some of the above points; and (l) current 
exclusion of crediting for GHG reductions or removals by sinks;…. 
(e) high transaction costs; and (f) the uncertainty regarding two major interlinked 
methodological issues, the identification of the project baseline and additionality.100  
 
 All in all, it is worth noticing that the AIJ pilot phase was characterized by the lack 
of stronger oversight mostly due to a weak regulatory regime. Therefore, even though the 
data presented were useful in assisting negotiators to model the regulatory framework for 
afforestation and reforestation practices in the CDM, and helped to indicate trends and 
potentials, the results lack accuracy. Nonetheless, the AIJ pilot phase was crucial in raising 
the Parties’ concerns over the technical, scientific and socio-economic challenges related to 
forest and forestry project-activities, which inevitably constituted one of the leading factors 
to the development of a stronger and tighter regulatory regime specifically to deal with 
forest and forestry activities in the CDM.101  
 
ii. The CDM of the Kyoto Protocol 
 
                                                 
99 Michaelowa, supra note 82, at 202. 
100 SBSTA & SBI 1999 Report, supra note 83, at 6, 10. 
101 See generally Costa, supra note 43, at 2 (providing further analysis on forestry projects under the AIJ pilot 
phase).  
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 The outcome of the COP-3 negotiations was that project-based joint implementation 
launched by the UNFCCC, and implemented by the pilot phase, ended up divided by the 
Kyoto Protocol into Joint Implementation (JI), and the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). Within the scope of this paper is worthy noticing that the final language of Article 
12 (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol provided the CDM with threefold objective: assist non-
Annex I Parties in achieving sustainable development, contribute with the Convention’s 
overall objective, and help developed countries in achieving their quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments.102
 
iii. The Controversy Whether Forest and Forestry Activities Were 
Meant to be Included in the CDM 
 
 Prior to the negotiations at COP-3, in Kyoto, the Parties had before them the 
SBSTA synthesis report on activities implemented jointly under the pilot phase.103 The 
report was noted by decision 10/CP.3104, and stressed out the existence of 6 ongoing 
forestry preservation and afforestation activities, with ample participation of developing 
countries in hosting the projects.105  
 Opponents of the inclusion of sinks in the CDM106 argued that Article 12 did not 
provide legal support for such inclusion. Their main argument was a comparison with 
Article 6 (JI), in which the inclusion of “sinks” is clearly stated, as opposed to Article 12 
(CDM). In addition, the opposition also included the allegation that because sink projects 
could not be accurately measured, they did not meet Article 12.5(b)’s requirement that 
certification under the CDM should be on the basis of “[r]eal, measurable, and long-term 
benefits related to the mitigation of climate change;”.107
 Indeed, whereas Article 6 (JI) of the Kyoto Protocol expressly referred to projects 
providing enhancement of removals by sinks, Article 12 (CDM) generally states project 
activities without further specifications whatsoever.108 However, a closer analysis of the 
climate change regime did not provide for the exclusion of sink projects from the CDM.109 
First, because JI in the UNFCCC was the origin of the CDM, and under the pilot phase 
forest and forestry activities were being utilized amply by Annex I and non-Annex I 
Parties. Second, because Article 12 also did not specify any other type of projects, such as 
renewable energy, or energy efficiency. It was simply limited to stating the CDM 
                                                 
102 Kyoto Protocol art. 12.2, supra note 14. 
103 SBSTA & SBI 1997 Report, supra note 88. 
104 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
Third Session, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 10/CP.3, Activities 
implemented jointly under the pilot phase, Kyoto, December 1 - 11, 1997, 41 FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1 (March 
25, 1998) [hereinafter Decision 10/CP.3]. 
105 SBSTA & SBI 1997 Report, supra note 88, at 4, 5. 
106 See Costa, supra note 43, at 8 (stressing out that the main opponents to the inclusion of forestry in the 
CDM were the EU, China and India, and that proponents were Latin American countries and the Umbrella 
Group – Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Iceland).  
107 GRUBB ET AL., supra note 52, at 241. 
108 Compare Kyoto Protocol art. 6, supra note 14 (expressly referring to enhancement of removals by sinks of 
greenhouse gases), with Kyoto Protocol art. 12, supra note 14 (broadly defining the clean development 
mechanism). 
109 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 15, at 645 (“Both the Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol clearly 
contemplate that sinks such as forest would be within the ambit of the climate regime.”).  
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objectives, and setting general operational guidance.110 The omission only constitutes 
inaccuracy in the written language utilized in the Kyoto Protocol, but nothing beyond that. 
As per the impossibility to measure and monitor forestry projects, currently approved 
monitoring methodologies by the CDM Executive Board demonstrate that although harder 
than other types of projects, forestry activities can be monitored and measured.  
 A final common ground was only possible due to some degree of leverage that 
countries pushing for the inclusion of forestry activities (Umbrella Group) had,111 
particularly the U.S., Japan, Canada and Australia,112 so that the Protocol could enter into 
force by achieving its required target of 55 per cent of global anthropogenic GHG 
emissions.113 Considering that the U.S. along with other Umbrella Group countries account 
for over half of the world’s emissions, their engagement was crucial to the Protocol’s 
success. Another important element relied on the fact that the EU was not going to accept 
the inclusion of nuclear projects in the CDM. In order to avoid any attempt from the U.S., 
other developed country, or even China and India to push forward the debate on the 
inclusion of nuclear energy projects, the EU allowed some flexibility and ended up 
accepting forestry activities in the CDM.114 The controversy was finally settled at COP-7, 
in Marrakech, when negotiators agreed to include forestry in the CDM, but limited to 
afforestation and reforestation activities.115  
 
iv. COP-7, Marrakech Accords, 2001, COP-9, Milan, 2003 & COP-
10, Buenos Aires, 2004 
 
 After failing to reach consensus at COP-6, and COP-6 “bis” on the issue of land use, 
land-use change and forestry generally, progress made during those two sections of the 
conference of the Parties allowed a final agreement on the inclusion of forestry activities in 
the CDM at COP-7, in Marrakesh, 2001.116 The outcome of this meeting was called 
“Marrakesh Accords”.117 Through the Annex to a draft decision on LULUCF the Parties 
finally agreed on the inclusion of forestry projects in the CDM based on three pillars of 
eligibility and offsetting limitations, and regulatory flexibility for future commitment 
periods, as follow: 1) forestry in the CDM is limited to afforestation and reforestation 
activities; 2) addition limitation to a Parties’ assigned amount of 1 per cent of base year 
emissions, times five (which represents 20% of an Annex I country overall target)118; and 
3) a regulatory regime for future commitment periods shall be decided during the 
                                                 
110 See Costa, supra note 43, at 2 (“Article 12 on the CDM referred only to ‘emmision reductions’ with no 
mention of any specifically eligible activities.”).  
111 12 Earth Negotiations Bulleting 176, at 13 (2001), available at 
http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12176e.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2007) [hereinafter ENB Final COP-6]. 
112 Schwartz, supra note 75, at 456. 
113 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 25. 
114 Schwartz, supra note 75, at 457. 
115 Decision 11/CP.7, supra note 45, at 60. 
116 See ENB Final COP-6, supra note 111, at 13 (“The collapse of The Hague negotiations was attributed to 
many observers to disagreement over LULUCF issues: ‘It was sinks that sunk The Hague.’”).  
117 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
Seventh Session, Part Two: Action Taken, Decision 1/CP.7, The Marrakesh Ministerial Declaration, 
Marrakesh, Oct. 29 – Nov. 10, 2001, 3 FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (January 21, 2002) [hereinafter Decision 
1/CP.7]. 
118 Costa, supra note 43, at 10. 
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negotiations on the second commitment period.119
 Overall, and at least for the first commitment period, the EU’s main interests 
prevailed over the ones from the Umbrella Group.120 The EU succeeded at banning nuclear 
projects in the CDM (decision 17/CP.7), and at limiting not only forestry to afforestation 
and reforestation, but also the amount accountable against an Annex I Party’s assigned 
amount.121 In practice, since the EU – Emissions Trading Scheme excluded carbon credits 
originated from LULUCF activities,122 and considering European countries (and their 
private entities) constitute the vast majority of Annex I buyers (taking into account that the 
U.S. has not yet ratified the Kyoto Protocol),123 the inclusion of forestry in the CDM did 
not affect significantly EU’s interests for the first commitment period. On the other hand, 
the Umbrella Group, if not with the desired amplitude, inserted sinks in the CDM, and left 
open the debate for future commitment periods.  
 Once forestry made it to the CDM, and the Parties had established general eligibility 
and offsetting limitations and flexibility on the debate for future commitment periods, an 
operational regulatory regime became a requirement. Without further and specific progress 
at COP-8, in New Delhi, 2002, the Parties would agree upon a thorough regulatory regime 
for forestry in the CDM at COP-9, in Milan, 2003.124 Decision 19/CP.9 set up modalities 
and procedures for afforestation and reforestation project activities under the CDM.125 
 Decision 19/CP.9 was also particularly important because it affirmed the principles 
of Decision 11/CP.7 on LULUCF, and envisioned a more flexible regulatory regime for 
small-scale forestry projects in the CDM,126 following a model that the Parties had already 
implemented at COP-8 for other types of activities (renewable energy and energy 
efficiency) in the CDM (Annex II to decision 21/CP.8).127  
 The forestry legal framework in the CDM was completed for the first commitment 
period, when the Parties at COP-10 in Buenos Aires, 2004, agreed upon decision 14/CP.10 
on simplified modalities and procedures for small-scale afforestation and reforestation 
                                                 
119 Decision 11/CP.7, supra note 45, at 60. 
120 See 12 Earth Negotiations Bulleting 76, at 15 (1997), available at 
http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb1276e.pdf  (last visited Apr. 6, 2007) [hereinafter ENB Final COP-7], at 
15 (stressing out that with the U.S. withdrawal the leverage power of Russia and some other countries from 
the Umbrella Group increased, and that to strike a deal the EU and China were compelled to concede on many 
issues, but overall the pathway to ratification was open and the outcome for the EU was a positive one, i.e. 
compliance mechanism).     
121 Decision 11/CP.7, supra note 45, at 60.  
122 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2004/101/EC, art. 1(2), 2004 O.J. (L338/18) 
[hereinafter EU Directive 2004/101]. 
123 See UNFCCC annex I, supra note 7 (with the additions made pursuant to decision 4/CP.3).  
124 Decision 19/CP.9, supra note 76, at 13.  
125 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session, Part Two: Action Taken, 
Decision 5/CMP.1, Modalities and procedures for afforestation and reforestation project activities under the 
clean development mechanism in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, Nov. 28 – 
Dec. 10, 2005, 61 FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (March 30, 2006) [hereinafter Decision 5/CMP.1]. 
126 Decision 19/CP.9, supra note 76, at 13. 
127 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
Eighth Session, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties, Annex II to Decision 21/CP.8, 
Guidance to the Executive Board of the clean development mechanism, New Delhi, Oct. 23 - Nov. 1, 2002, 18 
FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.3 (March 28, 2003) [hereinafter Decision 21/CP.8]. 
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project activities in the CDM.128 This regulatory regime was implemented at MOP-1, in 
Montreal, 2005, right after the Kyoto Protocol had entered into force.129 Table 3.1 below 
aims at providing a chronological overview of the general, and specific legal provisions 
applicable to forestry project activities under the CDM. 
   
Table 3.1 
 
Provision Subject Adoption Status 
Arts. 4.2(a)(b)(d) & 
3.3 / UNFCCC 
JI under the Convention General 1992 UNFCCC 
Dec. 5/CP.1 AIJ Pilot Phase General 1995 COP-1 
Arts. 3.3, 3.4 & 12 / 
Kyoto Protocol 
LULUCF Activities & the 
CDM 
General / Specific 1997 Kyoto Protocol 
Decs. 7 & 9/CP.4 CDM & LULUCF Work
Programme  
 General 1998 COP-4 
Decs. 11, 15 & 
17/CP.7 
LULUCF Activities & the 
CDM 
Specific 2001 COP-7 
Dec. 21/CP.8  CDM Specific 2002 COP-8 
Dec. 19/CP.9 A/R in the CDM Specific 2003 COP-9 
Decs. 13 & 14/CP.10 Reporting A/R in the 
CDM & Simplified A/R 
Activities in the CDM 
Specific 2004 COP-10 
Decs. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 16 
& 17/CMP.1 
Adopting draft decisions 
recommended by previous 
COPs 
Specific / General 2005 MOP-1 
Source: prepared by the Author. 
 
b. Institutional Framework 
 
 The 1992 UNFCCC launched a comprehensive institutional framework to 
implement measures and polices, develop guidelines and methodologies, and to coordinate 
and translate the scientific work into norms and decisions130 aiming at achieving the 
                                                 
128 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
Tenth Session, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 14/CP.10, Simplified 
modalities and procedures for small-scale afforestation and reforestation project activities under the clean 
development mechanism in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and measures to facilitate their 
implementation, Buenos Aires, December 6 - 18, 2004, 26 FCCC/CP/2004/10/Add.2 (April 19, 2005) 
[hereinafter Decision 14/CP.10]. 
129 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session, Part One: Proceedings, 
Statement by the President of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol at its first session, Montreal, Nov. 28 – Dec. 10, 2005, 8 FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8 (March 30, 2006) 
(“The President said that there had been many remarkable achievements on the path from Kyoto to Montreal, 
including the steadfast efforts by many countries to promote the ratification of the Protocol, the completion of 
the Marrakesh Accords, and the prompt start of the clean development mechanism. National efforts to 
implement the provisions of the Protocol were now well under way.”).  
130 See Kenneth Hanf, The Domestic Basis of International Environmental Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 1-4 (Arild Underdal & Kenneth Hanf ed., 2000) 
(“[I]n a highly decentralized international system, the absence of a central government at the international 
level does not necessarily rule out the possibility of creating international environmental regimes and the 
organizations needed to implement and administer them.”). 
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Convention’s ultimate objective: to reduce anthropogenic emissions of GHGs.131 To this 
end, institutions dealing with forestry in the CDM are a sub-product of a broader 
framework, one that relies upon the supreme bodies of the Convention and the Protocol, but 
also upon more specific institutions unique to the control and management of afforestation 
and reforestation projects in the CDM. The following two subsections break down the 
CDM forestry institutional framework.  
 
i. Conference of the Parties (COPs) / Meeting of the Parties 
(MOPs) 
 
 With primary and exclusive decision-making power, the Conference of the Parties is 
the highest body on the institutional hierarchy, and from which the regulatory scheme 
emerges.132 Therefore, the legality of the decisions on forestry in the CDM is derived from 
the powers conferred by the Convention to the Conference of the Parties, including the 
decision as to whether adopt a protocol.133 The 1997 Kyoto Protocol, as a result of COP-3, 
expanded the specific CDM forestry institutional framework,134 and also added to the 
Conference of the Parties the function of serving as the meeting of the Parties to the 
Protocol.135  
ii. SBSTA & the CDM Executive Board. 
  
 The SBSTA is the advisory body to link the available scientific information to the 
decision-making process of the climate change regime.136 It is different from the IPCC, and 
it was not designed to replace it.137 Article 15 of the Kyoto Protocol determined that the 
subsidiary bodies created under the Convention remain in charge of providing scientific and 
technological advice and assistance to COPs serving as MOPs.138 Within the CDM forestry 
institution framework, the SBSTA takes into account the work produced by the IPCC, 
FAO, International Forum on Forests, among other international institutions, and provides 
guidance on scientific, technical and technological matters related to afforestation and 
reforestation, and recommends decisions to the COP/MOP.139  
                                                 
131 UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 2 (stating the ultimate objective of the Convention).  
132 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 15, at 233 (“Much like a corporate body of directors, the conferences of the 
parties (CoPs) are the primary policy-making organs of most global environmental treaty regimes. The CoPs 
usually occur once every one or two years and conduct the major business of monitoring, updating revising, 
and enforcing the conventions.”).  
133 UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 17. 
134 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 12.  
135 Id., art. 13. 
136 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
First Session, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 6/CP.1, The subsidiary 
bodies established by the Convention, Berlin, Mar. 28 – Apr. 7, 1995, 21 FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (June 6, 
1995) (the SBSTA was created to “be the link between the scientific, technical and technological assessments 
and the information provided by competent international bodies, and the policy-oriented needs of the 
Conference of the Parties.”). 
137 GRUBB ET AL., supra note 26, at 2. 
138 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 15. 
139 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific 
and Technological Advice on its Eighth Session, Bonn, June 2 – 12, 1998, 17, 18 FCCC/SBSTA/1998/6 
(August 12, 1998) [hereinafter Report SBSTA 8th Session] (a clear example of the SBSTA work is during 
COP-4, the Parties had before them the SBSTA report on its 8th session on land use, land-use change and 
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 Another important organ in the CDM forestry institutional framework is the CDM 
Executive Board (EB). Featured in Article 12.4 of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM Executive 
Board was implemented by decision 17/CP.7 to carry out the oversight function over 
activities in the CDM under the guidance and authority of the COP/MOP.140 Through 
decision 17/CP.7, the COP/MOP expanded EB’s supervisory role, adding to it decision-
making power over approval of Designated Operational Entities (DOEs),141 projects, 
including the final work on new methodologies, baseline and monitoring methodologies, 
and issuance of certified emission reduction (CER).142 In sum, the EB is the executive body 
in charge of handling projects undertaken pursuant to the CDM, and all related matters 
thereof.143
 
iii. Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) & Afforestation / 
Reforestation, and Methodologies Working Groups 
 
   The CDM Executive Board can accredit operational entities known as Designated 
Operational Entities (DOEs) and recommend them to the COP/MOP for final 
designation.144 The rationale behind the conception of DOEs is that by delegating to an 
independent company the validation of proposed CDM projects, and subsequent 
verification and certification emissions reductions, the EB preserves its oversight and 
decision-making role over proposed new methodologies, baselines and monitoring plans145, 
while counting on the efficiency of outside specialized private corporations to have a more 
agile process.146 Should the EB had to operate the technical field work of validation, 
verification, and certification of each proposed project, the financial and human resources 
necessary would make the process unfeasible.147  
                                                                                                                                                    
forestry. One of SBSTA’s conclusions on the topic was an interpretation of Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Many obstacles remained on different elements of implementing Article 3.3.  The SBSTA report mainly 
recognized that additional technical information was needed in order to fully implement LULUCF activities 
under the Protocol and requested IPCC to elaborate a technical report on the topic. It also requested the 
Parties to submit data and suggested methods, modalities, rules and guidelines on additional human-induced 
activities could be included in Article 3.4. The report also called for a workshop of experts aiming at 
exploring the issues raised by the IPCC report. Finally the workshop called for the secretariat to liaise with the 
secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity and of the Convention to Combat Desertification, 
International Forum on Forests, the FAO and all other international agencies and organizations that could 
provide helpful information on the topic).  
140 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
Seventh Session, Part Two: Action Taken, Decision 17/CP.7, Modalities and procedures for a clean 
development mechanism as defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, Marrakech, Oct. 29 – Nov. 10, 2001, 
21 FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (January 21, 2002) [hereinafter Decision 17/CP.7]. 
141 FAO Working Paper 3, supra note 87, at 9 (“DOEs are accredited by the Executive Board and perform two 
functions: validating CDM projects, and verifying and certifying emissions reductions from projects. A 
designated operational entity shall not perform validation or verification and certification on the same CDM 
A/R project activity.”). 
142 Decision 17/CP.7 annex to draft decision, supra note 140, at 27. 
143 Michaelowa, supra note 82, at 203. 
144 Decision 17/CP.7, supra note 140, at 21.  
145 See generally Michaelowa, supra note 82, at 203 (specifying the requirements for a company to be 
accredited as a DOE).  
146 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC, The First Ten Years, at 87 
(2004), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/first_ten_years_en.pdf.  
147 See Costa, supra note 43, at 5 (“It became obvious that third-party certification was instrumental in the 
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 In addition, by working with different and independent DOEs in the validation, 
verification and certification stages, the EB institutional framework is constantly being 
crosschecked, diminishing the margin for imprecise certified emissions reductions. This 
scheme is particularly important in the CDM context, considering that non-Annex I 
countries have no emissions limitation commitments.148 The downside is that such a 
comprehensive process adds bureaucracy and complexity, requiring high level of 
multidisciplinary expertise which ends up restricting the participation of developing 
countries’ stakeholders, despite the thorough capacity-building scheme envisioned by the 
climate change regime.149  
 Finally, taken into consideration the wide range of scientific, technical and 
technological expertise different projects under the CDM may require, the COP/MOP 
conferred upon the EB the authority to “establish committees, panels, or working groups to 
assist it in the performance of its functions.”.150  
 For forestry related projects, the EB at its fourteenth meeting agreed to establish an 
Afforestation and Reforestation Working Group (A&R WG).151 In assisting the EB, the 
A&R WG is responsible to comment on proposed new baselines and monitoring 
methodologies for forestry projects, prepare draft reformatted versions of those approved 
by the EB, and recommend available options to expand the applicability of approved A/R 
methodologies.152 In this sense, the A&G WG works closely and in consonance with the 
Methodologies Panel (Meth Panel) agreed upon the third meeting of the EB,153 which is 
designed to provide the EB with recommendations on guidelines for methodologies and for 
baselines and monitoring plans, including those for afforestation and reforestation 
projects.154  
 
iv. Multilateral Investment Institutions 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
validation and credibility of these new transactions.”).   
148 See id., at 4 (stressing out the problems inherent to a trading-scheme without commitments for developing 
countries, in which the commodity has value only for the buyer, but not for the seller) see also Swisher, supra 
note 27, at 58 (“This situation [lack of commitments for developing countries] makes permit trading 
problematic, because developing countries would have excess permits to sell to the industrialized countries, 
creating large North-South cash transfers in exchange for emission rights. This is easy to justify on the basis 
of equity, but the receipt of these transfers would stimulate economic activities that would counteract 
emissions reductions”).  
149 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on 
its Seventh Session, Part Two: Action Taken, Annex to Draft Decision attached to Decision 2/CP.7, Capacity 
building in developing countries (non-Annex I Parties), Marrakech, Oct. 29 – Nov. 10, 2001, 5 
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (January 21, 2002) [hereinafter Decision 2/CP.7]. 
150 Decision 17/CP.7 annex to draft decision, supra note 140, at 30.  
151 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Executive Board of the Clean 
Development Mechanism at its Fourteenth Meeting, Bonn, June 12-14, 2004, 8 CDM-EB-14 (June 14, 2004) 
[hereinafter EB 14th Meeting]. 
152 FAO Working Paper 3, supra note 87, at 9.  
153 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Executive Board of the Clean 
Development Mechanism at its Third  Meeting, Bonn, April 9-10, 2002, 3 CDM-EB-3 (April 17, 2002) 
[hereinafter EB 3rd Meeting]. 
154 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Executive Board of the 
Clean Development Mechanism at its Fourth  Meeting, Bonn, June  9-10, 2002, 3 CDM-EB-4 (June 10, 2002) 
[hereinafter EB 4th Meeting] (detailing the specific roles of the Meth Panel).  
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 Multilateral investors are an important element of the CDM forestry institution 
framework, and also in fomenting carbon markets worldwide. Within the initiatives to 
launch a forestry carbon market that could be attractive to investors, and project developers 
in the post-Kyoto, the following are worth mentioning: the Sydney Futures Exchange for 
forestry-based carbon credits, the GHG tradable permit trading mechanism coordinated by 
UNCTAD, and the GHG emissions trading programme of the International Petroleum 
Exchange.155 These early innovative attempts lead to “the creation of the International 
Emissions Trading Association, alongside the Emissions Market Association, the Chicago 
Climate Exchange, and country-level emission trading systems such as in the UK and 
Denmark.”156  
 The World Bank launched in 2003 the BioCarbon fund, described as a 
public/private initiative aiming at delivering “cost-effective emission reductions, while 
promoting biodiversity conservation and poverty alleviation.”157 The BioCarbon fund is 
inspired in the previous World Bank Prototype Carbon Fund established in 1999 to promote 
renewable energy and energy efficiency projects under the CDM.158 While there are 
general carbon investment funds currently available worldwide,159 within the CDM forestry 
institutional framework, the BioCarbon fund consolidates the World Bank initiative as the 
main multilateral investment institution, one that involves public and private investors, and 
is particularly sensitive to social and environmental benefits.160     
 
c. Provisions for Domestic Legal & Institutional Framework (Designated 
National Authority – DNA)  
 
 One of the core principles of the CDM is that participation is voluntary and 
dependent upon prior approval by each Party involved.161 Furthermore, in accomplishing 
one of the CDM’s objectives - assisting developing countries in achieving sustainable 
development – the COP/MOP requires project developers a formal evaluation issued by the 
host country of whether a proposed project activity meets its sustainable development 
goals.162 The procedural participation requirement given to a non-Annex I Party wishing to 
participate in the CDM and, therefore, externalize to project developers voluntariness and 
compliance with sustainable development goals, is by establishing a designated national 
                                                 
155 Costa, supra note 43, at 7. 
156 Id., at 7.  
157 The World Bank Carbon Finance Unit, BioCarbon Fund, 
http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=BioCF&ItemID=9708&FID=9708 (last visited Apr. 9, 2007) 
[hereinafter WB Carbon Finance Unit]. 
158 See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank Resolution No. 99-1, 
Authorizing establishment of the prototype carbon fund, in 1 THE WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW: LAW AND 
JUSTICE FOR DEVELOPMENT 433, 433 (Ko-Yung Tung & Rudolf V. Van Puymbroeck ed., Kluwer Law 
International, 2003).  
159 See Clemens Hüttner, Players Get Busy in CDM Markets, Carbon In Focus, http://www.3c-
company.com/fileadmin/downloads/press/pc/2007/PC_2007_03_Powernews.pdf, (last visited Apr. 9, 2007) 
(for instance the European Carbon Fund and other private investment carbon funds).  
160 See Michaelowa, supra note 82, at 202, 204, 205, 206 (detailing the World Bank’s carbon finance 
activities) see also The WB Carbon Finance Unit, supra note 259 (supporting the goals of promotion of 
biodiversity and poverty alleviation).  
161 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 12.5(a). 
162 Decision 17/CP.7, supra note 140, at 21. 
 27
authority (DNA).163 This provision opened up the field for the development of national 
legal and institutional frameworks by non-Annex I countries desiring to participate in the 
CDM.  
  
4. Current Obstacles, Challenges and Impacts (Positives and Negatives) to 
Forestry Project Activities under the CDM 
 
 In light of its controversial nature, forestry activities in the CDM have raised over 
the past decade many positives and negatives assessments regarding inherent impacts of 
their implementation. Moreover, the expansion of forestry over afforestation and 
reforestation activities is also facing political, legal and technical obstacles.  
 
a. Political, Policy and Legal Obstacles 
 
 G.J.H. van Hoof has pointed out that “[i]f delay in, or failure of ratification are the 
result of unwillingness on the part of the States concerned the problem, of course, is first of 
all of a political nature.”.164 This is the case of the U.S. refusal in ratifying the Kyoto 
Protocol, which added to the EU policy decision undertaken within its Emission Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) of rejecting CDM forestry projects,165 and the climate change forestry 
legal limitation to afforestation and reforestation activities, form the core obstacles 
examined in this section.166
 
i. U.S. Resistance in Ratifying the Kyoto Protocol 
 
 In 1998, the U.S Congress passed Senate Resolution 98 (S.Res.98), “urging the 
President not to agree to a treaty that did not include binding commitments for developing 
countries, or that would cause harm to the U.S. economy.”167 In March of 2001, the Bush 
administration announced the rejection of the Kyoto Protocol,168 shortly after the U.S. 
experienced the tragedy of September 11th. Though not totally clear if the terrorist attack 
influenced U.S. policies in the climate change regime, some have suggested that the lack of 
stronger involvement with the Kyoto Protocol over the past years indicates that the tragedy 
might had shifted U.S.’s focus.169  
 For what it represents economically and politically, the U.S. is a major player in any 
international negotiation. Therefore, the U.S. resistance in accepting the overall provisions 
of the Kyoto Protocol constitutes a significant political obstacle to the development of 
forestry activities within the climate change regime.170 By coming on board, the U.S. 
                                                 
163 Id., annex to draft decision, at 32. 
164 G. J. H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 122 (Kluwer Law & Taxation, 
1983).   
165 EU Directive 2004/101, supra note 122, art. 1(2).  
166 Decision 16/CMP.1 annex, supra note 48, at 7. 
167 JOHN R. JUSTUS & SUSAN R. FLETCHER, GLOBAL CLIMATE  CHANGE, C.R.S. DOC. NO. IB89005-108, at 10 
(2004). 
168 Id., at 11.  
169 Todd M. Lopez, A Look at Climate Change and the Evolution of the Kyoto Protocol, 43 NAT. RESOURCES 
J. 285, 306 (2003), see also Costa, supra note 43, at 10. 
170 See Michaelowa, supra note 82, at 202 (“[G]iven the absence of the US and the weakening of 
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would play a much greater role not only on actively pushing negotiations towards 
expanding eligible activities for future commitment periods, but also in fomenting the 
market for forestry certified emissions reductions (CERs).  
   
ii. EU Refusal to Accept CDM Forest and Forestry Project 
Activities 
 
 Effectively starting on 1 January 2005, the European Union Emission Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) is the world biggest GHG domestic emissions trading scheme.171 The 
market for CERs created by the EU ETS increased significantly the demand for project 
activities undertaken in the CDM. Although not for afforestation and reforestation, 
considering that the provision authorizing the use of CERs expressly excluded those from 
LULUCF activities.172 Because most of the countries with established commitments under 
the Kyoto Protocol are part of the EU,173 the policy of excluding CERs from forestry 
project activities is a major obstacle for the enhancement of a stronger market in this area, 
which inevitably hampers the development of new forestry-based GHG mitigation 
projects.174      
 
iii. CDM Limitation to Afforestation and Reforestation Project 
Activities 
 
 One of the major obstacles to an ample expansion of land use, land-use change and 
forestry projects in the CDM for the first commitment period is the legal limitation imposed 
upon these kinds of activities to merely anthropogenic afforestation and reforestation 
practices. The preoccupation and over precaution in effectively imposing such limitation 
made the climate change negotiators to include it in at least three different decisions 
(Annex to the draft decision 11/CP.7, decisions 17/CP.7,175 and 19/CP.9176) prior to the 
first meeting of the Parties, and also in those adopted thereof.177 Moreover, “[t]he literature 
regarding forestry as a climate change mitigation strategy suggests that efforts to constrain 
project-based forestry interventions to reforestation and afforestation projects is technically 
                                                                                                                                                    
industrialized country emission targets through higher allowances for sinks, the demand for emission 
reductions abroad will be much lower than originally anticipated.”).  
171 Marjan Peeters, The Enforcement of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading in Europe – Reliability Ensured? 
3 (Oct. 17, 2006) (paper presented to the Fourth IUCN Colloquium on Environment Enforcement and 
Compliance) (on file with the author).  
172 See EU Directive 2004/101/EC, art. 1(2), supra note 122 (“All CERs and ERUs that are issued and may be 
used in accordance with the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent decisions adopted thereunder 
may be used in the Community scheme: (b) except for CERs and EURs from land use, land use change and 
forestry activities.”).  
173 See UNFCCC annex I, supra note 7 (with the additions made pursuant to decision 4/CP.3). 
174 See Costa, supra note 43, at 9 (referring to the fact that an environment of uncertainty affects the appetite 
for forestry-based GHG mitigation projects in detriment of clean energy and energy efficiency projects).   
175 See Decision 11/CP.7, supra note 45, at 54, see also Decision 17/CP.7, supra note 242, at 20.  
176 See Decision 19/CP.9, supra note 76, at 13. 
177 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session, Part Two: Action Taken, 
Montreal, Nov. 28 – Dec. 10, 2005, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (March 30, 2006). 
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inappropriate.”178 Therefore, such limitation constitutes a legal obstacle for the expansion 
and further developments of LULUCF activities within the climate change regime in future 
commitment periods. 
 
b. Technical Challenges 
 
 According to FAO, the forestry sector is “technically especially challenging in 
terms of CDM project formulation….”.179 The first substantial decision addressing 
accountability for domestic action on LULUCF (decision 11/CP.7) in its request to the 
SBSTA, called for the development of definitions and modalities for including afforestation 
and reforestation in the CDM, without leaving aside the issues of non-permanence, 
additionality and leakage.180 These technical concerns were based on the IPCC work 
expressed in its 2000 special report on LULUCF.181 In addition, decision 19/CP.9’s 
requirement that non-Annex I countries shall opt for a definition of forest based on pre-
established parameters182, added another technical challenge addressed by the FAO Forest 




 Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol establishes that emissions reductions from CDM 
projects have to be “additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified 
project activity.”184 The rationale behind additionality lies on the fact that “if developing 
nation would have undertaken the same emissions reduction projects even in the absence of 
Annex I investment, the world could have enjoyed the same emissions reductions without 
the CDM and without giving Annex I countries credits that let them emit more.”185  
 Aiming at assisting forestry project developers, the Afforestation Reforestation 
Working Group (AR WG) at its fifth meeting revised a tool for demonstration and 
assessment of additionality.186 The CDM Executive Board adopted it at its twenty first 
meeting as a highly recommended guideline although not mandatory,187 which shows that 
considerable progress was made over the past decade and a half. 
                                                 
178 Trexler et al., supra note 67, at 29. 
179 FAO Working Paper 3, supra note 87, at 1. 
180 See Decision 11/CP.7, supra note 45, at 54. 
181 See generally IPCC Special Report LULUCF, supra note 17, at 12 (bringing to the attention of policy-
makers the technical challenges related to LULUCF).  
182 See Decision 19/CP.9, Item “F” of the Annex to the draft decision, supra note 76, at 13. 
183 See Till Neeff, Heiner von Luepke, Dieter Schoene, Choosing a forest definition for the Clean 
Development Mechanism, (FAO Forests and Climate Change, Working Paper No. 4, 2006).  
184 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 12.5(c). 
185 Schwartz, supra note 75, at 426. 
186 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Annex 16 – Tool for demonstrating the 
additionality of afforestation and reforestation - to the Report of the Executive Board of the Clean 
Development Mechanism at its Twenty First Meeting, Bonn, September 28-30, 2005, 8 CDM-EB-21 
(September 30, 2005) available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Panels/ar/ARWG05_repan2_Additionality_Tool_final.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2007). 
187 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Executive Board of the Clean 
Development Mechanism at its Twenty First Meeting, Bonn, September 28-30, 2005, 8 CDM-EB-21 
(September 30, 2005). 
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 Verifying whether a project activity meets the additionality requirement is crucial 
for the emissions trading scheme, and often constitute a technical challenge, especially in 
the forestry field188 due to the fact that such natural ecosystems are exposed to innumerous 
unpredictable natural and anthropogenic factors (e.g., fires, extreme meteorological events, 
pests, urban sprawling, etc.).189 Therefore, additionality is a necessary technical burden that 
needs to be properly addressed in a project-by-project basis.190  
   
ii. Domestic Definition of Forest 
 
 In the 2000 special report on land use, land-use change and forestry, the IPCC 
highlighted that a successful forestry carbon offset program would necessarily depend on 
clear definitions of forest and forestry activities. The definitions of forest varied 
considerably among countries based on different criteria (e.g., legal, administrative, or 
cultural consideration).191 Nonetheless, for the successful implementation of LULUCF it 
was crucial to harmonize the definitions for the climate change regime.192 In an attempt to 
harmonize domestic definitions, the annex to the draft decision attached to decision 
19/CP.9 imposed as a mandatory requirement that countries define forest prior to 
participating in the CDM. This provision allowed some flexibility for the Parties in 
defining forests to opt for a minimum tree crown cover, land area, and tree height between 
numbers varying from 10 to 30 per cent, 0.05 to 1 hectare, and 2 to 5 meters, 
respectively.193 The rationale behind this was to provide the Parties some margin to adjust 
their domestic definition accordantly to their natural and geographic realities. An 
international uniform definition would not be able to encompass the enormous variety of 
ecosystems around the world, and would inevitably end up favoring some countries in 
detriment of others.194
 Soon after adopted, then, the definition requirement became another technical 
challenge inherit to forestry activities in the CDM. In 2006, FAO issued its Forest and 
Climate Change Working Paper 4 specifically addressing the issue of choosing a forest 
definition for the CDM, and presenting recommendations for a country to choose the best 
parameters to the definition of forest, based on the criteria that would better serve the 
interests of a non-Annex I Party when participating in the CDM.195 Proper selection of 
parameters, conceived by the Marrakesh Accords in defining forests, has a direct effect on 
eligible areas for afforestation and reforestation projects, and reflects the evolution of the 
topic, while adding another technical challenge upon participant Parties and developers. 
 
                                                 
188 See GRUBB ET AL., supra note 52, at 192 (“[t]he question of ‘additionality’ under the CDM – and possibly 
sinks – is so complex that it cannot be assumed that all emission reductions under these mechanisms will be 
real and additional.”).  
189 See IPCC Special Report LULUCF, supra note 17, at 16 (describing the risks that LULUCF projects are 
subject to).  
190 FAO Working Paper 3, supra note 87, at 5. 
191 Id., at 14.  
192 Id., at 5.  
193 Decision 19/CP.9, annex to the draft decision, supra note 76, at 13.  
194 See Neeff et al., supra note 183, at 7 (stressing out the importance of opting for appropriate parameters 
when defining forest upon participation in the CDM).   
195 Id., at 7. 
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iii. Defining Baseline and Monitoring Methodologies 
 
 Complex enough by nature, baseline scenarios and monitoring methodologies196 are 
even more challenging in the ambit of afforestation and afforestation activities than they are 
for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects.197 The credibility of the CERs from 
afforestation and reforestation projects is constantly at stake due to anthropogenic and 
naturally-occurring phenomena that can disturb the project.198 As a result, up-to-date there 
are just over 5 approved baseline and monitoring methodologies for afforestation and 
reforestation projects, against more than 50 for energy efficiency and renewable energy 
activities.199 Thus, the regulatory development of standards for determining baselines and 
monitoring methodologies is a remarkable evolution in the CDM forestry legal framework, 
but also a major and necessary technical challenge.  
  
iv. Non-Permanence / Reversibility & Leakage 
 
 Two additional technical challenges typical to forestry project activities are non-
permanence and leakage200. Based on the experience provided by the AIJ pilot phase, the 
2000 IPCC special report on LULUCF identified the lack of proper addressability of non-
permanence and leakage by project developers.201 Almost five years latter, the forestry 
legal framework adopted in Milan at COP-9 evolved by expressly incorporating “leakage” 
as long as it can be measured (there must be an outside damage, and it must be quantified) 
and attributable (causation) to the forestry project activity.202 As to the reversibility issue, 
the Parties adopted IPCC’s second recommendation by imposing a minimum crediting 
period of 20 years with the possibility of being renewed twice, and a maximum of 30 years 
without renewal.203  
  
c. Environmental Impacts 
 
 According to the 2000 IPCC special report on LULUCF, forestry projects in the 
CDM “aiming to mitigate climate change may provide socioeconomic and environmental 
benefits primarily within project boundaries, although they may also pose risks of negative 
impacts”.204 These impacts can be of environmental, socio-economic and cultural nature.   
 
                                                 
196 Swisher, supra note 26, at 72 (“Long-term monitoring of forestry and land-use projects can also be 
complex.”). 
197 See id., at 63 (“In the case of power supply projects, the baseline can be relatively clearly determined from 
the carbon content of the fossil fuel replaced.”).  
198 IPCC Special Report LULUCF, supra note 17, at 10. 
199 UNFCCC Homepage, supra note 4 (providing with a list of approved methodologies, which is being 
constantly updated).  
200 See Decision 19/CP.9, annex to the draft decision, supra note 76, at 16 (defining “leakage” as “the increase 
in greenhouse gas emissions by sources which occurs outside the boundary of an afforestation or reforestation 
project activity under the CDM which is masurable and attribute to the afforestation or reforestation project 
activity.”).  
201 Id., at 15, 16.  
202 Decision 19/CP.9, annex to the draft decision, supra note 76, at 16. 
203 Id., at 21.  
204 IPCC Special Report LULUCF, supra note 17, at 15. 
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i. Conversion of Forested Areas into Plantations, Grazing, and 
Agricultural Land 
 
 The expansion of allowable forestry activities could encourage replacement of 
mature old grown forests by fast growing tree plantations, and conversion into cropland and 
grazing land with higher rates of carbon sequestration potentials.205 While limited to 
afforestation and reforestation projects, the risks are diminished based on the own 
definitions of these activities provided by the climate change regime.206 The rationale for 
establishing a historical baseline is to avoid deforestation of mature forests for subsequent 
re-growth for CDM carbon credit purposes.207  
 On the other hand, if the CDM legal framework is properly used (and the practice is 
already demonstrating positive actions)208 it can provide the means to avoid harmful 
conversions. One possibility for subsequent commitment periods would be the inclusion in 
the CDM of accountability for the carbon net source of deforestation practices before any 
replacement and/or conversion of forested land into fast-growing tree plantation, grazing 
and cropland management.209 Another would be allowing for forest preservation and 
conservation projects under the CDM.210 Mature forests do not have the same sequestration 
potentials, but credits could be conferred upon carbon storage.211 In this case, though, some 
degree of flexibility in the “human-induced” criterion would have to be provided.212  
 In any event, preserving the role of the CDM EB, and strengthening the CDM 
forestry legal framework are necessary requirements to expanding the list of permissible 




 Considering the abovementioned threats of harmful conversions, the impacts on 
biodiversity have the potential to be catastrophic. To the contrary, if actions are well 
articulated taken into consideration existing ecosystems protective provisions, in addition 
with forest conservation projects for future commitment periods, the impacts can be rather 
positive ones.213 Therefore, the climate change regime shall be seen as an important 
                                                 
205 Janine Bloomfield & Holly L. Pearson, Land use, Land-use Change, Forestry, and Agricultural Activities 
in the Clean Development Mechanism: Estimates of Greenhouse Gas Offset Potential, 5 MITIGATION 
ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 9, 12 (2000). 
206 See Decision 11/CP.7, annex to draft decision, supra note 45, at 58 (they are both are defined as the 
human-induced conversion of non-forested areas into forested, but with a slightly difference: afforestation 
presupposes that the converted land into forested has not been forested for at least 50 years; reforestation is 
the conversion of land that once was forested into forested land, but limited to those areas that were not 
forested on 31 December 1989). 
207 Bloomfield et al., supra note 205, at 12. 
208 See FAO Working Paper 3, supra note 87, at 13 (providing that the CDM A/R project activities standards 
are being set high).  
209 Bloomfield et al., supra note 205, at 12. 
210 See Trexler et al., supra note 67, at 4 (advocating against the constraints upon forestry projects to 
afforestation and reforestation activities).  
211 Bloomfield et al., supra note 205, at 12. 
212 See GRUBB ET AL., supra note 52, at 79 (considering some Parties did not want to confer credits for activities 
that were naturally occurring anyhow).  
213 See Costa, supra note 43, at 1 (“[f]orestry-based carbon offset – whether they promote direct preservation, 
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available tool by different stakeholders involved with biodiversity conservation, rather than 
an obstacle that has to be overcome.   
 
iii. Natural Ecosystems 
 
 Either positively or negatively, CDM forestry project activities also have the 
potential to impact natural ecosystems. Among potential threats posed by forestry projects 
to natural ecosystems are introduction of invasive alien species,214 increases in erosion 
processes,215 and adverse impacts on water supplies.216 The synthesis report on projects 
undertaken in the pilot phase reflected positive impacts on natural ecosystems, such as 
“improving water quality and reducing erosion of hydrological issues.”217 In this sense, 
worth noticing that the same provisions in the climate change regime designed to protect 




 Leakage, in addition to constituting a technical challenge for the trading scheme, 
also has the potential to adversely impact the environment. Taking the hypothetical 
example of a reforestation project in a degraded pasture land; if the replacement of the 
pasture land into forested area leads to the practice of deforestation elsewhere for the 
creation of new grazing land, the area deforested faces significant environmental 
impacts.219  
  
d. Socio-Economic Impacts 
 
 An analysis of the socio-economic impacts is required whenever deemed relevant 
by the host country or the project participants.220 For the purpose of this section, socio-
economic impacts of forestry projects are examined in light of capacity-building related to 
employment opportunities and/or job losses, international trade, financial return to local 
entities, and financial public and private forestry subsidies.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
sustainable forestry practices or reforestation – all have the potential to positively support the goals of the 
Biodiversity Convention.”). 
214 See generally Schwartz, supra note 75, at 421, 422 (examining the potential risks of genetically modified 
trees of creating invasive species).  
215 See Robert J. Zomer, Antonio Trabucco, Oliver van Straaten & Deborah A. Bossio, Carbon, Land and 
Water: A Global Analysis of the Hydrologic Dimensions of Climate Change Mitigation through 
Afforestation/Reforestation, (International Water Management Institute, Research Report No. 101 at 3, 2006) 
(“[S]ome activities may increase erosion, through disturbances caused by planting, establishment, and 
building of access roads.”).  
216 See id., at 4 (examining the potentials impacts of afforestation and reforestation projects on water 
supplies).  
217 SBSTA & SBI 1997 Report, supra note 88, at 11. 
218 See Decision 5/CMP.1, supra note 125, at 64. 
219 Cf. IPCC Special Report LULUCF, supra note 17, at 11 (providing for “positive leakage”, when a project 
activity leads to new management approaches or environmental friendly technology adoption). 
220 Decision 5/CMP.1, supra note 125, at 64. 
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i. Capacity-building & Transfer of Sound Technology 
 
 Due to the complexities of the CDM forestry mechanism,221 and the consequent 
demand for high qualified technical personnel, in addition to the implementation of new 
technologies, forestry projects in developing country could lead to job losses, or open 
employment opportunities mainly for developed countries personnel instead.222 But one 
important element to dissuade this premise is that for these types of project activities the 
involvement of local communities is a quasi requirement for the achievement of the desired 
positive effects.223 Consequently, and based on previous experiences undertaken during the 
pilot phase, the likely trend is that forestry project activities will significantly increase 
capacity-building and employment opportunities in developing countries, as well as benefit 
local communities with transfer of new and sound technologies.224   
  
ii. International Trade 
 
 Presumably, only “[p]rojects affecting the supply of timber products or consumption 
of energy services, for example, can affect price signals for the rest of the market, 
potentially counteracting a portion of the calculated benefits of the original project.”225 This 
means that the currently allowed afforestation and reforestation project activities have little 
or no potential to affect international trade, because the timber products such projects are 
generating did not exist in the first place, adding to the fact that they have to undergo 
undisturbed226. Therefore, they could not possibly impact the existing timber market.227 
Nonetheless, during the discussions for upcoming commitment periods on to whether or not 
to allow for other LULUCF activities, such as forest conservation and management, 
harmonized policies and actions between the climate change regime and other international 
forest forums are strongly recommended.228  
                                                 
221 See Bloomfield et al., supra note 205, at 21 (“Land-use decisions are complex, however, and are based on 
many conflicting economic, social, political, and environmental factors in addition to the amount of carbon 
that could be credited for a particular project.”).  
222 See Michaelowa, supra note 82, at 206 (“A possible barrier to CDM projects can be a requirement that 
projects shall not lead to job losses. Any modern technology will displace workers due to its more efficient 
character. However, often more jobs are created through the development effects induced by the use of the 
new technology. Thus a rigid job loss criterion only looking at the project itself is likely to prevent most CDM 
projects.”).  
223 See Janine Bloomfield, Marina Ratchford & Sandra Brown, Land-Use Change and Forestry in the Kyoto 
Protocol, 5 MITIGATION ADAPTATION  STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 3, 6 (2000) (“[F]or projects to be 
conceived of, designed, and successfully implemented, stakeholder support, both by project funders and by 
the host countries and local communities, is crucial.”).   
224 See SBSTA & SBI 1997 Report, supra note 88, at 17 (reproducing socio-economic benefits reported by 
the Parties).    
225 Trexler et al., supra note 67, at 39.  
226 See Decision 19/CP.9, supra note 76, at 13 (“Taking into account the issues of non-permanence….”).  
227 See Earth Negotiations Bulleting UNFCCC SB 26, at 4 (2007), available at 
http://www.iisd.ca/climate/sb26/enbots/ (last visited May 12, 2007) [hereinafter ENB UNFCCC SB 26] 
(pointing to sustainable forestry practices as a solution against adverse effects in the international timber 
market).  
228 Cf. Schwartz, supra note 75, at 444, 445 (2006) (“The International Tropical Timber Agreement (‘ITTA’) 
will not apply to CDM projects. The ITTA aims to ensure that all tropical timber products traded 
internationally originate in substantially managed forests. (…) [O]ther potentially applicable agreements – 
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iii. Local Participation & Financial Return to Local Stakeholders 
 
 Any potential interference with the needs of local stakeholders caused by a CDM 
forestry activity has not only to be properly assessed, but generate enough income capable 
of offsetting eventual losses.229 Even before the tighter regulation on modalities and 
procedures for forestry projects in the CDM adopted at COP.9, 2004,230 the IPCC in its 
2000 special report had identified that enabling local stakeholders to share the financial 
benefits of CDM forestry activities was a necessary social condition.231 A significant 
regulatory step towards the implementation of a framework that could effectively embrace 
profitability to local participation was the provision for small-scale afforestation and 
reforestation projects, targeting low-income communities and individuals.232  
 While the international legal work is already in place, added the factor that the 
practice is still incipient233, the challenges for upcoming commitment periods are promising 
and include: firstly, considerations over profitability sharing in forest management and 
conservation projects, allowing also for local participation in the decision-making process 
at all levels (from project conception to project implementation and management)234; and 
secondly, domestic policies and measures harmonized with the international legal 
framework so as to allow local communities to benefit from forestry project activities.235
 
iv. Domestic CDM Forestry Subsidies 
 
 A domestic CDM forestry subsidy scheme harmonized with the climate change 
international legal framework is a powerful incentive tool for current afforestation and 
reforestation projects, and also for other LULUCF activities eventually included in 
upcoming commitment periods. This harmonization should start with the elimination of 
conflicting domestic subsidies as directed by the Parties at COP/MOP-1;236 for example, 
                                                                                                                                                    
like the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (‘CITIES’) or the 
FAO Tropical Forestry Action Plan – will most likely never apply to GM tree reforestation projects.”) see 
also ENB UNFCCC SB 26, supra note 384, at 4 (proposing sustainable forestry as a solution to minimize the 
adverse effects of forest conservation and management projects in the international timber market).  
229 See Decision 5/CMP.1, supra note 125, at 64 (providing for a social-economic impact assessment in case 
the preliminary analysis indicates the potential for an socio-economic adverse impact).   
230 Decision 19/CP.9, supra note 76, at 13. 
231 IPCC Special Report LULUCF, supra note 17, at 17.  
232 See Decision 19/CP.9 annex to draft decision, supra note 76, at 16 (“‘Small-scale afforestation and 
reforestation project activities under the CDM’ are those that are expected to result in net anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas removals by sinks of less than 8 kilotonnes of CO2 per year and are developed or 
implemented by low-income communities and individuals as determined by the host Party.”). 
233 See generally Risoe CDM, supra note 351 (listing all CDM forestry projects that have been sent to 
validation/determination). 
234 Cf. Schwartz, supra note 75, at 480 (making similar proposal to the debates over genetically modified 
forestry projects in the CDM for upcoming commitment periods). 
235 See Sagemuller, supra note 12, at 236 (“[D]omestic legal regimes may allow individuals landowners to 
generate credits from LULUCF activities that may be traded on the international market.”).  
236 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session, Part Two: Action Taken, 
Decision 31/CMP.1, Matters relating to Article 3, paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, Nov. 28 – 
Dec. 10, 2005, 9 FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.4 (March 30, 2006). 
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domestic legislation penalizing forest conservation and promoting land clearance 
(deforestation) for agricultural purposes and urban sprawl.237  
 Worth noticing, that public subsidies are not limit to financial support. Rather they 
may encompass a variety of different governmental encouragement actions such as direct 
payment in cash, goods or services to forest landowners for promoting carbon 
sequestration, purchase of land or land interests, implementation of general forest 
management service programmes, among others.238 Thus, national public subsidies to 
LULUCF project activities shall be planned not only accordantly to the international legal 
framework, but also to other domestic subsidies for forest management generally.  
 
5. Overcoming Obstacles and Adverse Impacts of Forest and Forestry Project 
Activities Under the CDM for Upcoming Commitment Periods 
 
 Overall, if well managed and implemented, project-based forest and forestry 
activities in the CDM beyond just afforestation and reforestation practices can serve many 
environmental, social and economic purposes and benefit small rural and poor communities 
and individuals. The political, policies, legal and technical challenges and obstacles, and 
risks of forest management and conservation projects to biodiversity, watersheds or to 
promoting deforestation are overcome by the positives impacts.239 This section, then, is 
dedicated to examining trends and proposing actions for future commitment periods.  
 
a. Potential Upcoming Trends to Overcoming Political, Policies and Legal 
Obstacles 
 
 In overcoming the U.S. resistance to the Kyoto Protocol, two possibilities can play a 
major role. First, the 2006 U.S. congressional election saw the Democratic Party take the 
majority from the Republicans, which could indicate a Democratic victory in the 2008 
presidential election. Based on the Democratic sensibility to climate change, and 
considering that the Clinton administration signed the Kyoto Protocol but faced a 
Republican Congress, one could expect that the U.S. is much more likely to ratify the 
Protocol.240  
 With respect to the EU, two factors indicate that it will not easily accept forestry 
activities in the CDM in future commitment periods. The EU refusal to accept credits from 
forestry project-activities in the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) Directive is the first 
clear indication.241 But also, should the afforestation and reforestation limitation be 
                                                 
237 Steven A Kennett, Carbon Sinks and the Kyoto Protocol: Legal and Policy Mechanisms for Domestic 
Implementation, 21(3) J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES L. 252, 273 (2003).  
238 FAO Climate Change and the Forest Sector, supra note 18, at 46.  
239 Trexler et. al., supra note 67, at 29. 
240 See JUSTUS ET AL., supra note 167, at 11 (comparing the Clinton administration policies with the Bush 
administration policies toward the international climate change legal regime).  
241 See THE WORLD BANK, Overview At Loggerheads? Agricultural Expansion, Poverty Reduction, and 
Environment in the Tropical Forests, at 23 (2007) (prepared by Kenneth M. Chomitz) [hereinafter The World 
Bank] (“[S]ome observers think that tackling climate change requires paying about $3 a ton for CO2 
abatement – and European Union (EU) members are currently paying up to $20 a ton (though this price is 
volatile). In other words, deforesters are destroying a carbon storage asset theoretically worth $1,500-$10,000 
to create a pasture worth $200-$500 (per hectare). Yet carbon markets, such as those under the Kyoto 
 37
maintained in the CDM in future commitment periods, the language used in the ETS 
suggests that is not likely that the EU will accept the expansion of allowable activities.242 In 
the EU ETS Directive legislators used the term LULUCF instead of just afforestation and 
reforestation,243 what indicates that the EU, already anticipating future attempts to 
broadening the scope of forestry projects in the CDM, opted to exclude them all in advance 
from its ETS.  
 Finally, currently CDM forestry activities limitation to afforestation and 
reforestation projects can legally be overcome for future commitment periods. Decision 
11.CP.7 provides that the limitation is valid for the first commitment period only, and that 
the Parties should decide upon new LULUCF activities for upcoming commitment 
periods.244  
 
b. Stronger Link Between the Climate Change Legal Regime and Other 
Major Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
 
  
 In the topic of CDM forestry activities, in light of environmental, social and 
political implications arising internationally from the climate change debate, it is crucial 
that the legal regime create links beyond the Liaison Group envisioned to coordinate 
actions amongst the Rio Conventions (UNFCCC, CBD, and UNCCD).245 Stronger 
communications channels ought to be opened with the World Bank and International Labor 
Organization (ILO) on the potential implications and benefits of project-based forestry 
activities on employment conditions and opportunities, following the example set by the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).246 On the crosscutting issues of biodiversity and 
CDM forestry projects, FAO has provided a paradigm to be followed in the socio-economic 
area by developing a specific study on the interlinkages between biological diversity and 
climate change.247 Firmer institutional cooperation beyond interconnected environmental 
areas would help to prevent poor social conditions such as the ones threatening the 
credibility of CDM biofuels and biomass project activities.248  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Protocol and EU Emissions Trading Scheme, do not reward forestholders for reduced emissions from avoided 
deforestation.”).  
242 See Sagemuller, supra note 12, at 233 (noting that the EU decision not to recognize credits from LULUCF 
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243 EU Directive 2004/101 art. 1(2), supra note 122. 
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245 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
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with other conventions, New Delhi, Oct. 23 - Nov. 1, 2002, 32 FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1 (March 28, 2003) 
[hereinafter Decision 13/CP.8]. 
246 FAO Climate Change and the Forest Sector, supra note 18, at 31 (considering employment and local 
benefits in proposing guidelines to national legislations harmonized with the CDM forestry legal framework).  
247 Id., at 4.  
248 See Inter-American Development Bank official website, 
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[hereinafter IADB homepage] (announcing investments in ethanol and biofuels production while closely 




c. Environmental and Socio-Economic Impact Analysis and Assessments 
(EIA / SEIA)  
 
 The importance of an environmental impact assessment, and in the CDM forestry 
context also a socio-economic impact assessment, is doubtless. Nonetheless, two major 
factors appear to limit the power of climate change negotiators to go beyond merely 
requiring preliminary analyses instead of an impact assessment before any risk can be 
potentially foreseen. The first one is a legal limitation. Article 21 of the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration clearly states that countries have the sovereign right to exploit their own natural 
resources, pursuant to their own environmental policies.249 In addition, Principle 17 of the 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, while embracing EIA, establishes that 
it shall be conducted when the proposed activity is likely to adversely impact the 
environment.250  
 The second factor limiting climate change negotiators to require an impact 
assessment as a starting pre-condition to project validation seems to be of policy nature. 
That is, the whole validation, verification and certification process for afforestation and 
reforestation projects are already overburdensome, bureaucratic, and time consuming in 
nature, and also present high procedural costs. Adding an environmental and social-
economic impact assessment for those projects that, at first, do not present the risk for any 
adverse impacts would make CDM forestry activities practically unfeasible in light of the 
aforementioned legal, political, policies and technical obstacles already in place.251  
 
d. Good Governance: Education, Training, Public Awareness, Land 
Tenure, Transparency, and Domestic Accountability. 
 
 Good governance in the CDM forestry can be achieved by supporting domestic 
legislation to enhance the role of sinks in the climate change legal regime,252 which 
includes inter alia: developing instruments to combat corruption, regulating ownership and 
management of public forested areas, and reconciling the interests of private owners (land 
tenure), promoting education, training and public awareness, and ensuring transparency.253 
Those are key elements for the success of the CDM forestry scheme for the upcoming, and 
most importantly, during the debates for subsequent commitment periods.254 The positive 
                                                 
249 See ALAN GILPIN, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (EIA) CUTTING EDGE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY, 9 (Cambridge Univ. Press) (1995) (The UN Conference on the Human Environment, held in 
Stockholm in June 1972, endorsed a declaration of 26 principles, essentially about sustainable development 
and EIA, although these terms did not appear in the text of the declaration.”).  
250 UNCED, supra note 5. 
251 See Trexler et al., supra note 67, at 35 (“Overly detailed reviews of environmental impacts could require 
the equivalent of an environmental impact statement. Such a process could prove so expensive that it would 
impede the ability to prepare and fund projects.”).  
252 FAO Climate Change and the Forest Sector, supra note 18, at 53 (“Having a legal foundation for forest 
GHG mitigation projects will enable forests to play a positive role in UNFCCC compliance.”).  
253 See generally THE WORLD BANK, supra note 241, at 19 (providing policy recommendations to maximize 
forest management and conservation and poverty reduction).  
254 See generally FAO Climate Change and the Forest Sector, supra note 18, at 29-51 (2004) (stressing the 
importance of socio-economic elements in domestic decision-making processes).  
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interaction of the aforementioned socio-economic elements with the forestry practice is 
crucial in overcoming the obstacles and challenges faced by the CDM forestry activities for 
future commitment periods.255  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
 Forest and forestry projects in the CDM were extremely controversial during the 
climate change negotiations, and the result was a legal limitation to only afforestation and 
reforestation practices. The main concerns included the fact that forest and forestry 
activities are difficult to monitor, provided cheap carbon credits inhibiting stronger 
domestic mitigation action, and the fear that those projects could lead to deforestation.  
 However, the fact is that CDM forest and forestry projects can provide benefits that 
overcome their downsides. Among the benefits, if flexibility on the human-induced 
requirement is allowed for future commitment periods, forest conservation projects can 
help fostering biodiversity, and sustainable forestry practices can provide positive revenue 
alternatives for local communities.  
 In order for that to occur, current obstacles such as the U.S. resistance in ratifying 
the Kyoto Protocol, the EU refusal in accepting CDM LULUCF credits, and the legal 
limitation on the allowable practices need to be overcome. At the same time, technical 
challenges, including additionality, defining baseline and monitoring methodologies, 
choosing a domestic definition for forest, overseeing issues of non-permanence and 
leakages, while extremely tight, are necessary instruments to assure the positive outcomes 
of forestry projects capable of softening the resistance for upcoming commitment periods.  
     
                                                 
255 See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 241, at 22 (“While forests have many environmental benefits, only two 
command a global constituency with potentially large willingness to pay for those benefits: carbon storage 
and conservation of globally significant biodiversity. Mobilizing global finance for these environmental 
services is a crucial long-term challenge.”).  
